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INTRODUCTION

In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court overturned its ruling
in Furman v. Georgia and held that the death penalty, as
administered by the states, was not per se "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.' Yet errors
continue to occur at an alarming rate in the capital punishment
system-over one hundred death row inmates have been released
pursuant to evidence of actual innocence since 1973.2 Indeed, the
number of death row exonerations has been steadily increasing in
3
recent years.
Of those exonerations, DNA testing played a substantial role in
twelve. 4 Many more have benefited from the assistance of innocence
projects funded and operated by private groups.5 The role of these
groups, combined with increased media attention to recent prison and
death row releases, has contributed to a resurgence in the public
debate over the role of the death penalty in the American criminal

1.
428 U.S. 153, 188-206 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (overruling Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death penalty as administered by the states was
unconstitutional)).
2.
Innocence and the Death Penalty, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
3.
Id. Over the past ten years there has been an average of five releases per year. Id.
4.
Innocence: Freed from Death Row, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
5.
See, e.g., CARDOZO LAW INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/innocence-project (last visited Feb. 27, 2003); INNOCENCE PROJECT NORTHWEST (Innocence
Project Northwest, Seattle, WA, 2000), at http://www.law.washington.edu/ipnw/ (last visited Jan.
4, 2003); Raju Chebium, Innocence Project Credited with Expanding Awareness of DNA Testing
in Law Enforcement, CNN.COM, Dec. 22, 2000, at www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/12/22/innocence.project.crim/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (stating that although two dozen
law schools in the nation had innocence projects in 2000, these programs were not sufficient to
handle the heavy caseload).
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justice system. 6 A 1993 study showed that fifty-eight percent of voters
were concerned about the danger of mistaken executions. 7 This
percentage has risen steadily in recent years as the number of
exonerations has increased.8 In May 2001, a Gallup Poll indicated that
overall public support for the death penalty has eroded from eighty
percent to sixty-five percent since 1994. 9 In addition, an ABC news
poll found that fifty-one percent of Americans support a nationwide
moratorium on capital punishment while a commission studies its
fairness.10 The number of inmates on death row and the number of
executions have both been similarly decreasing, although it is unclear

6.
See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoriaon Executions, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 845, 845 (2001) (arguing that recent calls for death penalty moratoria in the United States
are evidence of a worldwide trend toward abolition); Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness:
Why We Are Moving Towards Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital
Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 744-45 (2001) (explaining that advances in DNA technology
and resulting increases in death row exonerations have changed public discourse about the death
penalty without leading to changes in the administration of capital cases). In his article, Tabak
also addresses the related problem of those sentenced to death who, although guilty, would not
be on death row were it not for egregious due process violations that occurred during the
investigation and the trial. Tabak, supra, at 762; see also JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000)

(providing numerous accounts of exonerations due to postconviction DNA testing).
7.
STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF
MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS (1993) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE DANGER] (examining forty-eight cases

of innocents released for various reasons), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpic.r06.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
8.
This inverse relationship-increasing evidence of wrongful convictions accompanied by
a decrease in support for the death penalty-bears out Marshall's second hypothesis from his
concurrence in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 315, 361-63 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Marshall's second hypothesis in Furman was that public support for capital punishment is based
on the public's ignorance of its lack of a deterrent function, its expense as compared to life
imprisonment, and other problems. Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-32 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (restating his position in Furman); Alan W. Clarke et al., Executing the
Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall Hypotheses, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 309, 334
(2000-2001) (presenting study results indicating that students' support for the death penalty
decreased after reading essays on the incidence of error in capital cases).
9.
Other polls indicate increased public support for moratoria on executions while fairness
studies assess the death penalty as administered by the states. See generally Summaries of
Recent Poll Findings, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Jan. 24, 2003), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#Gallup-l0/02
(last visited Apr.
11, 2003). Other studies estimate the percentage of Americans who support moratoria pending
fairness studies as high as sixty-three percent. Id.
While sixty-five percent is a significant number, this percentage is the lowest that it has been
in two decades. Crime and Punishment: The Death Penalty Becomes a High-ProfileIssue, 49 SEP.
FED. LAW. 34 (2002). In addition, many polls have found that support for the death penalty
greatly diminishes when the individuals questioned are offered the alternative of supporting life
imprisonment without parole. Summaries of Recent Poll Findings, supra.
10. Summaries of Recent Poll Findings,supra note 9.
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whether the decreases are related." For the first time since 1976,
fewer executions have been occurring each year, even in leading death
penalty states. 12 This decrease is likely due to both a reduction in the
crime rate and decreased public support for the death penalty. 13
While there has been a sharp decrease in executions in recent
years, the number of inmates on death row nationwide continued to
increase until very recently. 4 Significant systemic reforms have not
accompanied the shift in public opinion concerning the death

11. Adam Liptak, Death Row Numbers Decline as Challenges to System Rise, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2003, at Al (citing public realization of problems in the administration of the death
penalty as the probable reason for this decline).
12. Brooke A. Masters, Executions Decrease for the Second Year; Va., Texas Show Sharp
Drops amid a National Trend, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al. In 1999, the number of
executions peaked at ninety-eight, the greatest number of executions since the early 1950s. Id.;
see also Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT. (U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/glance/tables/exetab.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2003) (noting that eighty-five inmates were executed in 2000, thirteen percent
fewer than in 1999). In 2001, there were sixty-six executions, a twenty-two percent decline from
2000, yet the number climbed to seventy-one in 2002. Executions by Year, DPIC (Death Penalty
Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Apr. 22, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146 (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
13. Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12; see also SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM.
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.6.82, Prisoners Executed Under Civil Authority, available at

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebookl1995/pdflt682.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003). In 2001, the
number of death row inmates decreased for the first time since capital punishment was
reinstated. See Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12.
Public opinion enters the capital punishment system slowly-both because it must do so
indirectly and because of systemic bias. While prosecutors, defense attorneys, and capital juries
are all members of the public, they are also all the products of their roles in the system. For
example, juries in capital cases are selected on the basis of their willingness to impose the death
penalty. They are therefore not necessarily a reflective sample of the public. If public opinion is
indeed causing a decrease in capital convictions, it is doing so in spite of the fact that capital
juries are composed of the members of the public who are more inclined to support the death
penalty. Public opinion outside of the capital jury context may therefore be shifting more rapidly
than that of the "public" that is present in the system. See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 6, at 750-52
(discussing how shifting public attitudes toward the death penalty will slowly alter the manner
in which it is administered). Tabak also examines the effects of these changing considerations on
the judiciary, prosecutors, and governors. Id.
14. See, e.g., Prisoners on Death Row, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.,
Dec. 15, 2002) (providing that the inmates on death row decreased in 2001 for the first time since
1975), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/dr.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003); Raju Chebium,
Reports of a Flawed Legal System Push Death Penalty Debate into High Gear, CNN.COM (stating
that there were 3,670 people on death rows nationwide in 2001), available at
http://www.cnn.com/LAW/trials.and.cases/case.files/0006/deathpenalty/overview.html
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2003); see also Richard C. Dieter, International Perspectives on the Death
Penalty: A Costly Isolation for the U.S., DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Oct.
1999) (examining the United States' response to international efforts to curtail the application of
the death penalty), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003);
supra note 13 and accompanying text. The United States is one of the few industrialized nations
that have retained capital punishment.
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penalty.1 5 Neither death penalty statutes nor the manner in which the
courts address capital cases has changed significantly in tandem with
shifting public support. 16 In fact, most recent exonerations have
resulted from inmates' determined insistence on DNA testing and the
intervention of private advocacy groups, rather than from changes in
the prosecution of capital cases or in the administration of the death
penalty.1 7 In other words, innocents' avoidance of execution has often
been the outcome of nothing more than a fortunate convergence of
unusual circumstances. The criminal justice system is not preventing
wrongful executions-private citizens are.18
The consequence of these errors is even more disturbing: proof
of innocence on death row means that innocents have almost certainly
been executed since 1976.19 Estimates have put the number as high as
15. See Tabak, supra note 6, at 739-43 (providing a list of "symptoms" of increasing public
awareness of the problems with capital punishment). Tabak's list includes, inter alia, the
American Bar Association's 1997 resolution calling for a moratorium on executions until certain
enumerated problems are corrected, the increased attention of the media to capital cases, the
Illinois moratorium on executions after several releases, and the publication of Actual Innocence:
Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted. Tabak, supra note 6,
at 739-43. See generally DWYER ET AL., supra note 6.
16. See Tabak, supra note 6, at 745. Tabak claims that judges have not yet noticed the shift
in public support for capital punishment, and that even once they do, any judicial response will
not occur quickly. Id. There is evidence, however, of the beginnings of judicial responsiveness to
public opinion shifts. Two federal judges recently found that the death penalty as administered is
unconstitutional because of the risk of executing innocent individuals. United States v.
Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25164 (2d Cir.
2002); United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002). Although one of the decisions was
overturned on appeal, and the other may also be reversed, the holdings sparked significant
public debate. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Second Ruling Against U.S. Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2002, at A15.
17. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 6; see also Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the Risk of
Executing the Innocent: A Case for Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA
Testing, 55 VAND. L. REV. 953, 961-86 (2002) (outlining the various difficulties of access to DNA
testing--especially posthumously to determine if innocents have indeed been executed).
A notable recent exception to the lack of governmental action to reduce errors in the
administration of capital punishment occurred in January when Governor George Ryan of
Illinois commuted all 156 death row sentences in that state. See Associated Press, Illinois
Governor to Commute All Death Row Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003; In Ryan's Words: "I
Must Act,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003.
18. According to Richard Dieter, the executive director of the Death Penalty Information
Center, most cases of innocence "were discovered not because of the normal appeals process, but
rather as a result of new scientific techniques, investigation by journalists, and the dedicated
work of expert attorneys, not available to the typical death row inmate." Richard Dieter,
Innocence and the Death Penalty: The IncreasingDanger of Executing the Innocent, DPIC (Death
Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., July 15, 1997), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/inn.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
19. See, e.g., Case Studies of Innocents Released, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 24, 2003) (hypothesizing as to the number of innocents who have been
executed), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpic.r06.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003); Alice
at
available
ABOLITIONIST,
NEW
Exposed,
Penalty
Death
Kim,
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one innocent person exonerated for every seven executed. 20 The mere
possibility of this outcome is adequate justification for reform, and
reliance on private innocence projects to correct the mistakes of the
justice system is neither efficient nor desirable. By retaining the
current system, the states and the federal government are implicitly
acknowledging either that government action is inadequate to deal
with the problem of mistaken convictions or that such mistakes are
not actually a problem. Systemic reform to the capital punishment
system, at both the state and federal levels, is necessary to preventor at least to curtail-the occurrence of wrongful convictions. 21 Such
systemic reform must be thorough to be effective, beginning with an
honest acknowledgement of the problem and the imposition of
moratoria on executions at both the state and federal levels while
22
studies clarify the extent of the problem.
While current proposed legislation, 23 including the Innocence
Protection Act, 24 addresses the problem of wrongful convictions by
working to ensure that they never occur, little has been done to
address the problems faced by those wrongfully convicted individuals
who have recently been released. Inmates wrongfully convicted and
later released pursuant to exculpatory DNA evidence should be
http://www.nodeathpenalty.org/newsab0201/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003) (describing
the recent execution of Malcolm Rent Johnson and subsequent discovery of additional evidence).
In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall's concurrence stated that "[wie have no way of judging
how many innocent persons have been executed, but we can be certain that there were some."
408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). One study reported twenty-three
instances of innocent people being executed in the United States in this century. Hugo A. Bedau
& Michael Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 71
(1987).
20. DWYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 218.
21. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous ConvictionsAre Common
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 471-72 (1996) (arguing that the criminal justice system in
general and capital punishment in particular are inherently fallible).
There are also those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty because it is immoral,
unconstitutional, or simply an inefficient form of deterrence. For example, in his dissent in
Gregg, Justice Brennan argued that capital punishment, "for whatever crime and under all
circumstances," violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment"
as well as Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). His dissent emphasized that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted to
take into account "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 227. These arguments, however, are
beyond the scope of this Note.
22. See ABCNEwS WASH. POST POLL, POLLINGREPORT.COM Apr. 20-24, 2001 (showing that
fifty-one percent of the public support a halt to all executions while an independent commission
studies the fairness of state administration of capital punishment), available at
http://pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
23. Current proposed legislation includes the Innocence Protection Act and state efforts to
improve inmates' access to postconviction DNA testing.
24. Innocence Project Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001); see also
discussion infra Part V (discussing proposed legislative reforms).
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restored to their preconviction position in society. To compensate these
individuals and to attempt to prevent wrongful convictions, states and
the federal government must create a system of restitution for
innocent people who spend time on death row. Such a system should
address all aspects of the problem and should seek to restore
providing
"innocence" to the greatest extent possible-by
compensation for lost wages, pain and suffering as well as
psychological and reentry assistance. The federal and state
governments must take responsibility for mistakes in the
administration of capital punishment, or government attempts to hold
citizens accountable for their actions will increasingly lack legitimacy.
This Note will examine the necessity of a dual approach to the
problem of wrongful capital convictions: implementing systemic
changes to prevent mistaken convictions and improving available
remedies for those who have been wrongfully convicted and rightly
released. Part II will discuss the extent of the problem and the
primary factors leading to wrongful convictions. Part III will detail the
importance of postconviction DNA testing, the difficulties faced by
inmates seeking such testing, and the problem of using that evidence
once it is obtained. Part IV will examine three case studies of innocent
men released from death row-their trials, releases, and lives since
release. Part V will analyze proposed solutions to the problem of
wrongful convictions and current developments at both the state and
federal levels, including the proposed Innocence Protection Act. Part
VI will examine current methods by which released inmates can seek
compensation. After noting that both the current system and the
major proposals for reform do little to account for those innocents
wrongly convicted and later released, Part VII will present proposals
for systemic changes and access to postrelease rehabilitation and
restitution.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM-EXAMPLES OF FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES

The number of innocent death row inmates recently released is
even more disturbing when compared to the number of capital
convictions. Only about two percent of murder convictions, less than
two-tenths of one percent of all convictions for violent crimes, and only
three-hundredths of one percent of all criminal convictions, lead to
death sentences. 25 Statistics on exonerations indicate, however, that
25. Gross, supra note 21, at 472-73. Recent proof of a high error rate in capital cases should
lead to a reexamination of the possibility of error in all aspects of state and federal criminal
justice systems.
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there may be higher incidence of error in capital cases than in other
criminal cases. 26 Studies reveal a ratio of one exoneration based on
evidence of actual innocence for every five to seven executions. 27 These
numbers demonstrate the serious likelihood that innocent people are
put to death under the current system of capital punishment. A recent
study found that serious errors occur in almost seventy percent of all
28
trials leading to the death penalty.
The occurrence of wrongful convictions in capital cases is too
prevalent to be the result of any single isolated factor, especially since
there is substantial variation in the administration of the death
29
penalty in the thirty-eight states with capital punishment.
Numerous factors have contributed to the high incidence of these
erroneous convictions, including faulty forensic science, prosecutorial
and police misconduct, racial prejudice, inadequate defense counsel,
and mental incompetence. 30 It is also possible, as many of those who
advocate the abolition of capital punishment argue, that the errors are

According to Elizabeth Semel, the director of the death penalty clinic at the University of
California at Berkeley, 'The death penalty is the tip of the criminal justice iceberg. If you expend
millions of dollars to make the death penalty more fair in its application, what about the
majority of cases where you have many similar problems?" Jodi Wilgoren, Panel in Illinois Seeks
to Reform Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at Al.
26. See Gross, supra note 21, at 474-97 (examining factors contributing to increased errors
in certain types of criminal cases in general and in capital cases in particular). Scott Turow also
contends that "the very impulse that makes the public want the death penalty for heinous crimes
prevents the system from careful discernment in those cases." Jodi Wilgoren, Opposing
Executions, in Fiction and in Real Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at B9. Death penalty scholar
James Liebman has noted that the overall error rate in capital cases in the United States is
sixty-eight percent. James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1950 (2000).
It is also possible that this unusually high rate of identified mistakes is the result of
heightened scrutiny applied to capital sentences after the fact. See Tabak, supra note 6, at 736
(explaining that the criminal justice errors uncovered by DNA testing should alert society to the
possibility of error when such testing cannot be done). In addition, many guilty defendants avoid
the death penalty by way of guilty plea bargains-an option that innocent individuals are not as
likely to choose as guilty individuals.
27. Clarke et al., supra note 8, at 319.
28. Chebium, supra note 14. These serious errors included unreliable evidence, inadequate
representation, and questionable expert testimony. Id. According to Chebium, recent studies
caused the American Medical Association to call for a national moratorium on the death penalty
until the problem of the availability of DNA testing to death row inmates is resolved. Id.
29. The twelve states without the death penalty are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. The District of Columbia also does not have the death penalty, and Illinois and
Maryland have recently enacted death penalty moratoria. See States with the Death Penalty,
CNN.cOM
at http://www.cnn.com/LAW/trials.and.cases/case.files/0006/map/map.html
(last
visited Jan. 5, 2003).
30. See ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7.
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the inevitable by-product of fallible human nature. 31 One study
examined all of the capital convictions and appeals between 1973 and
1995 and found that the overall rate of prejudicial error in capital
cases was sixty-eight percent.3 2 The three most common errors in
capital cases were "extremely incompetent" defense lawyers,
33
prosecutorial misconduct, and faulty jury instructions.
Moreover, recent federal action may increase the risk of
wrongful convictions and executions. In 1995, Congress ceased
funding postconviction defender organizations that were in place in
twenty states. 34 In addition, certain federal statutes, including the
5
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),3
curtail the appellate routes available to inmates on death row, thus
decreasing the length of time between conviction and execution. The
AEDPA limits the availability of federal habeas corpus review for
those on death row by requiring that a death row inmate file a habeas
petition within six months after his capital conviction is affirmed on
appeal. 36 Currently, the average length of time that wrongly convicted
inmates spend on death row is eight years.3 7 This length of time is
significant for two contrasting reasons. Eight years is a long time for
an innocent person to spend on death row, but if the time between
capital sentencing and execution decreases, there will be even less
time to correct mistakes of justice.3 8

31. Clarke et al., supra note 8, at 321 (quoting the Staff Report for the House Judiciary
Committee).
32.

JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-

1995, at i (2000).
33. Id. at ii.
34. Catherine Cowan, States Revisit the Death Penalty, ST. GOV'T NEWS, May 1, 2001, at 12.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000); see also Tabak, supra note 6, at 737 (explaining that the
AEDPA undercuts courts' ability to review capital sentences for possible errors); Joseph L.
Hoffman, Justices Weave Intricate Web of Habeas Corpus Decisions, 37 TRIAL 62 (Dec. 2001)
(similar).
36. § 2263(a); Judge Josephine Linker Hart, Available Post-Trial Relief After State
CriminalConviction When Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes 'Actual Innocence," 22 U. ARK.
L1TTLE ROCK L. REV. 629, 632 (2000) (describing the standard for granting a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence in Arkansas).
37. Innocence: Freed from Death Row, supra note 4, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
38. See Stephen J. Spurr, The Futureof Capital Punishment:Determinantsof the Time from
Death Sentence to Execution, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 19 (2002) (presenting data showing that
the probability of execution once a death sentence is imposed has been increasing concomitant
with a decrease in the amount of time between sentence and execution).
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A. Faulty ForensicScience
"Junk science" is one factor contributing to the conviction of the
innocent. There have been numerous cases of "experts" and forensic
scientists who have lied about their credentials and who have
knowingly presented erroneous findings.3 9 The recent case of forensic
scientist Joyce Gilchrist highlights the problematic effects of relying
on supposedly unbiased experts in the field of forensic science. 40 While
working with the Oklahoma City Police Department, Gilchrist's
41
testimony helped to send twenty-three defendants to death row.
Since there is now evidence that Gilchrist gave false or flawed
testimony throughout her twenty-one-year career as a forensic
scientist, all of the cases are being reexamined. 42 However, eleven of
43
the men she helped to send to death row have already been executed.
There is evidence that Gilchrist's violations were not necessarily an
aberration and that questionable practices may be widespread in the
44
field of forensic science.
Much of the controversy surrounding forensic science stems
from the lack of regulation in the field. 45 There is no license
requirement for forensic scientists, and states' regulatory schemes
vary dramatically. 46 In addition, forensic science laboratories often

39. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on ForensicScience,
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 627, 629-30 (2001) (providing examples of forensic scientists who lied about
their credentials, gave false or misleading testimony, and provided erroneous reports); Deborah
Hastings, Testimony Doubted in Execution Case, AP NEWS, Aug. 29, 2001 (describing Gilchrist's
role in convicting Malcolm Rent Johnson, who was recently executed amid doubts of his guilt),
Jeffrey Kofman, Death
available at http://www.truthinjustice.org/malcolm-johnson.html;
Sentence Overturned: Judges Cite Police Chemist's Testimony, ABCNEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2001
(describing the case of Alfred Brian Mitchell, whose death sentence was recently overturned
after the court determined that Joyce Gilchrist provided false DNA evidence which may have led
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us[DailyNews/deathavailable at
to
the
conviction),
penaltyreversal_010814.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
40. See Kofman, supra note 39. There were questions concerning the validity of Gilchrist's
testimony years ago. Id. Although prosecutors have maintained that her work was not essential
to the cases and that the outcomes would have been the same without her testimony, a federal
court disagreed. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Giannelli, supra note 39, at 630.
45. See generally Paul C. Gianelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 472-73 (1997) (arguing for
the creation of independent forensic science laboratories); Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic
Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109 (1991) (examining problems in
forensic science and advocating increased regulation).
46. Jonakait, supra note 45, at 129.
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lack clearly established procedures. 47 Critics of the system argue for
increased training for forensic scientists, 48 license requirements, a
federal regulatory scheme for all forensic science laboratories, 49 peer
review requirements, 50 and a requirement that states verify the
credentials of their expert witnesses. Faulty forensic science can lead
to the dual problems of acquitting the guilty and convicting the
innocent. 51 A mandatory regulatory scheme for forensic laboratories
may reduce both of these risks and help to restore legitimacy to the
system. In combination with state moves to create DNA databases,
such regulation could also substantially aid police investigations.
B. Police and ProsecutorialMisconduct
A second major factor leading to the conviction of innocent
individuals involves the extensive role the police and state prosecutors
play in criminal cases. Although the tendency is to blame wrongful
convictions on errors at trial, the errors often occur much earlier,
during the investigation of the crime. 52 First, there is the risk that the
53
police or citizens may identify the wrong person as the criminal.
Such a result may occur more often in capital cases, in which the
pressure on the investigators-from their superiors, the public, and
prosecutors-to produce a suspect is particularly intense. 54 Once the
police force has put its authoritative opinion behind a suspect's guilt,
the criminal justice system is often set irreversibly in motion against
55
that person, whether or not he is guilty.
In especially heinous cases, this momentum may result in
prosecutorial tunnel vision, blinding the government to other potential
suspects or to exculpatory evidence. 56 Prosecutorial reluctance to
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence can lead to wrongful
47.

Id. at 157.

48.

Id. at 124-28.

49. Id. at 116, 178-80 (suggesting the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act as a regulatory
model).
50. See id. at 133.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Gross, supra note 21, at 475.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 477-78.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 487; see also discussion infra Part IV (providing case studies which may illustrate
this tendency). See generally Richard A. Berk et al., Chance and the Death Penalty, 27 LAW &
SOCWY REV. 89 (1993) (discussing prosecutors' alleged capriciousness in deciding whether or not to
pursue the death penalty); Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas
Corpus, and Justice, 12 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 233, 266-67 (2002) (recounting Kirk
Bloodsworth's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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convictions when prosecutors either knowingly or negligently withhold
exculpatory evidence or admit false evidence at trial.57 Examples of
false confessions and lying informers are common in both capital and
noncapital cases. 58 Innocent defendants are sometimes pressured into
confessing to crimes they did not commit, especially when the prospect
of a plea bargain is presented to them. 59 When there is particularly
egregious evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors may be
60
held liable for contributing to the conviction of the innocent.
The most common prosecutorial cause of wrongful convictions
in capital cases, however, is the failure of the prosecution to exercise
its discretion to dismiss the charges against defendants. 6 1 Prosecutors
often continue to pursue cases in which the evidence is extremely
weak and even cases in which there is substantial evidence of the
defendant's innocence. 62 This persistence may be due either to the
prosecution's belief that the defendant is the guilty party or to
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (invalidating a conviction where prosecutors
deliberately misrepresented that shorts were bloody, when they knew the stains were paint); see
also DWYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 175-80 (providing examples of wrongful convictions resulting
from prosecutorial misconduct, including the case of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez). Of
course, this type of egregious misconduct remains the exception rather than the rule, and it can
occur in both capital and noncapital cases. However, this Note seeks to demonstrate that the
consequences of such misconduct are especially grave in capital cases.
58. Gross, supra note 21, at 479-85. One study found that misidentifications by
eyewitnesses were a factor in fifty-two percent of mistaken convictions. Id. at 479. Gross also
discusses examples of criminals implicating innocent defendants to exculpate themselves or to
gain favors from authorities. Id. at 481-82; see also Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the
"Innocent" An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999) (providing a skeptical look at supposedly false confessions
and exonerations); Jodi Wilgoren, Confession Had His Signature; DNA Did Not, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2002, at Al (providing a recent example of a false confession).
59. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Oshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 487 (1998). The Supreme Court has held, however, that the coercive use of a
plea bargain does not violate the defendant's right to due process. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
60. See Liability for Negligently Causing Arrest or Prosecutionof Another, 99 A.L.R.3d 1113
(1999) (describing sources of liability for negligently causing arrest or prosecution of another).
61. Gross, supra note 21, at 489. According to Gross, such prosecutorial discretion is
exercised less often in capital cases than in cases involving other felony charges. Id.
However, the most common cause of wrongful convictions overall-incorrect eyewitness
identifications-occurs during the investigation. See Monika Jain, Comment, Mitigating the
Dangers of Capital Convictions Based on Eyewitness Testimony Through Treason's Two-Witness
Rule, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court should overturn
death sentences supported by only one eyewitness identification as violations of the Eighth
Amendment, unless there is independent corroboration of the incriminating facts from the
eyewitness account); John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross.Racial
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2001) (presenting compelling evidence of the unique risk
of cross-racial misidentification).
62. Gross, supra note 21, at 489.
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systemic and public pressure to convict. 63 An innocent defendant who
makes it to trial faces a high risk of conviction because it is often too
late to correct errors at that point. 64 This probability is then
compounded by the possibility of inadequate defense counsel at trial.
C. InadequateDefense Counsel
Court-appointed counsel is available to those defendants who
request it at both the trial and appellate levels. 65 However, even if the
right to appointed counsel is established, there is no guarantee that
such counsel will be effective. 66 While inadequate representation at
trial or on appeal can give the defendant grounds to bring an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim after the fact, there is currently
67
no standard ensuring the adequacy of representation prior to trial.
At this stage, there is abundant evidence of defense counsel
inadequacy, ambivalence, and error, due to both a lack of standards
and a lack of funding. 68 Inadequate representation can be particularly
harmful in capital trials, due to the finality of the sentence.6 9 In
addition, ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate
70
levels may limit the capital defendant's options at a later point.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 492-93. Gross explores possible reasons for this high risk, including prosecutorial
persistence and the typical characteristics of capital juries. Id.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
66. See, e.g., Letty S. Di Guilio, Dying for the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in
State Post-Conviction Proceedings:State Statutes and Due Process in Capital Cases, 9 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 109 (1999) (citing State v. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
the state statute providing for the right to appointed counsel did not include a right to "effective
assistance" from that counsel)). Di Guilio argues that death penalty inmates have a right to
counsel and to effective assistance in postconviction proceedings, based on either the Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 110.
67. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (establishing the standard
for proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). This claim is available to defendants after
they receive inadequate representation. Id. However, it does little to prevent inadequate
assistance from occurring in the first place-except by deterring defense counsel from performing
poorly and encouraging them to represent their clients well.
68. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837-38 (1994) (detailing particularly
egregious examples of ineffective assistance of counsel and the resulting disproportionate impact
on poor capital defendants); Tabak, supra note 6, at 756-57 (providing an example of ineffective
assistance of counsel and a defendant's inability to have his sentence reversed).
69. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 849, 1256 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (addressing "the crisis in trial and state postconviction legal representation for
capital defendants that forms the backdrop to the federal right to counsel"); see also Strickland,
466 U.S. at 684-87 (holding that the standard of review for an inadequate assistance of counsel
claim is the same for death row inmates as for other defendants).
70. See discussion infra Part III.
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The Supreme Court has articulated a strict burden which a
convicted individual must meet to prove that representation at the
trial stage was ineffective. 71 First, a convicted criminal must show
that the attorney did not perform as would a reasonably competent
attorney in the same circumstances. 72 This inquiry is highly factspecific and essentially puts an attorney on trial, with each side
presenting legal experts' opinions as to what would constitute
reasonable representation in that particular situation. 73 Even if
defense counsel at the trial stage failed to perform at a reasonable
level of competence, the conviction stands unless the defendant can
also prove that those errors were prejudicial. 74 A defendant who brings
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has a difficult burden of
75
proof that is rarely overcome.
The problem of inadequate defense counsel continues to have
grave consequences even after conviction. 76 While there is a guarantee
of court-appointed counsel at the trial and appellate stages, no such
guarantee protects prisoners seeking postconviction relief from their
sentences. 77 Recent moves to eliminate funding for most postconviction
defender organizations will make it even more difficult for those
78
contesting death sentences to find adequate representation.
Although the relative impact of each of these factors on the
occurrence of wrongful convictions in capital cases remains unclear,
mistaken convictions clearly occur and will continue to occur absent
systemic change. The likelihood of wrongful executions will only
increase if wrongful convictions are not prevented or discovered.

71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87.
72. Id. at 693.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The burden of proof for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the same for a
convicted defendant in any case, whether capital or not. Id.
76. See discussion infra Part III.
77. See discussion infra Part III; see also, e.g., State of Ohio v. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d 1054
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that convicted defendant had no constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in postconviction relief proceeding and that a petition for postconviction
relief may be dismissed without a hearing); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 1256-57
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of standards and adequate compensation
for counsel for capital defendants and inmates pursuing postconviction relief).
78.

See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

AMERICAN CONDITION (2001) (noting that almost half of the states that administer the death
penalty have recently stopped funding their postconviction defender programs and death penalty
resource centers); Harvey Berkman, Costs Mount for Indigent Defense, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995,
at A18.
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OF DNA TESTING AND THE OBSTACLES TO ITS

USE
A. The History and Importance of DNA Evidence
DNA evidence has become increasingly effective at
simultaneously exonerating innocent individuals and helping to
identify the guilty. 79 Since DNA testing can both prevent wrongful
convictions before the fact and correct them once they occur, the
methods by which the accused and the convicted obtain access to DNA
testing are critical.8 0 Changing public attitudes about the death
penalty seem to reflect an increased awareness of the importance and
efficacy of DNA testing.8 1 The vast majority of Americans support a
guaranteed right to DNA testing for all death row inmates.8 2
Nevertheless, the hurdles faced by an inmate seeking to prove his
actual innocence usually are insurmountable.
B. Difficulties of ObtainingDNA Testing
While DNA evidence can be dispositive when it is available, it
is only an option in the small number of cases in which significant

79. Raju Chebium, Innocence Project Credited with Expanding Awareness of DNA Testing
in Law Enforcement, CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/12/22/innocence.project.crim/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (explaining the role Scheck and Neufeld played in
increasing public awareness of the importance of DNA testing for both conviction and
exoneration); Rudolph Giuliani, DNA Testing Aids the Search for Truth, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 2000
(stating that DNA is the most effective tool to protect the innocent, convict the guilty, and
possibly even to prevent crimes); see also LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(e) (2d ed.
1999) (discussing the essential dual functions of the criminal justice system: protecting the
innocent and convicting the guilty).
There are, of course, disadvantages to DNA testing. For example, critics cite privacy
concerns, possible discriminatory application of DNA testing or use of DNA evidence, and
potential Fourth Amendment search implications. See generally discussion infra Part V.B
(discussing and addressing some of these criticisms).
80. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.C (providing an example of a combined exoneration
and incrimination in the Earl Washington case study).
81. Id.; see supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
82. See Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12 (presenting poll results showing
that ninety-one percent of Americans support requiring courts to allow death row inmates access
to DNA tests).
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biological evidence is properly collected from the crime scene.8 3 Even
in cases in which DNA analysis is possible, most inmates, including
those on death row, do not have access to DNA testing.8 4 Those
inmates who attempt to procure DNA testing of biological evidence
from the crime scene face an imposing set of procedural and
substantive hurdles. First, the inmate usually must make a Brady
motion to test the DNA evidence from the crime scene.8 5 In addition,
although some current state statutory proposals could alter the
procedure,8 6 the heightened standards for obtaining a new trial are
applied once the inmate seeks to introduce evidence from
postconviction DNA testing.8 7 An inmate often must prove a
constitutional violation at trial to introduce the evidence.8 8 Similarly,
courts do not always consider the denial of access to DNA testing to be
89
a violation of constitutional due process guarantees.
83. See Tabak, supra note 6, at 735-36 (noting that exoneration is more likely in rapemurder cases than in murder cases, because of the greater likelihood of finding incriminating
biological evidence at the crime scene in those cases).
84. See, e.g., Associated Press, Virginia Court Rules Against DNA Testing in Rape Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002 (discussing a recent federal appeals court ruling that a man convicted
of rape has no constitutional right to DNA testing of the evidence). The court held that the denial
of testing was not a due process violation and that state or federal legislation, rather than the
courts, should address the issue of postconviction DNA testing. Id. But see Godschalk v.
Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding
that the plaintiff had a "due process right of access to genetic material for the limited purpose of
DNA testing" because it could provide exculpatory evidence).
85. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (granting relief where exculpatory evidence
had been withheld by prosecution). The Brady Court set the standard for overturning a
conviction based on due process violations and established the requirements that the prosecution
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and attempt to rectify false evidence. Id. Some
courts have extended its holding to allow DNA testing of evidence after trial, since such testing
may result in exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 423 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (allowing DNA testing despite the amount of time elapsed since trial, due to
potentially exculpatory nature of DNA evidence); State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 253-54 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (same); Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(allowing DNA testing under Brady); see also Lugosi, supra note 56, at 235 (explaining the use of
Brady motions to obtain postconviction DNA testing).
86. Most states now have statutes allowing postconviction DNA testing. See discussion
infra Part VIB; see also Frances X. Clines, Virginia May Collect DNA in Every Arrest for a
Felony, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at A22 (stating that both chambers of the Virginia General
Assembly have adopted versions of the plan to enlarge the state's DNA database, which is
already the largest in the nation, to include genetic samples from everyone arrested on suspicion
of a violent crime). But cf. Associated Press, supra note 84 (detailing a Virginia inmate's recent
unsuccessful attempt to obtain DNA testing).
87. See, e.g., State v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 749 (Neb. 2001) (denying petitioner's
request to compel state-funded postconviction DNA testing, because there was no statutory
authorization for such a claim or for such tests, even under the Nebraska Post-Conviction Act).
88. Id.
89. State v. Scudder, 722 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "it is well
settled that constitutional issues may not be considered in a postconviction proceeding where
they have already been, or could have been, litigated by the defendant on direct appeal"). For
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Even if an inmate succeeds in obtaining DNA testing of the
crime scene evidence for comparison with his own DNA, the
procurement and processing of the potential DNA evidence must meet
strict requirements to guard against contamination. 90 Failure to follow
the protocol for collecting DNA and for maintaining a proper chain of
custody can introduce errors which will render the evidence
inadmissible.91
C. Difficulties of Using DNA Evidence in a Motion for a New Trial
Based on Newly Discovered Evidence or Habeas Corpus Review
Even if a death row inmate succeeds in obtaining DNA testing
of evidence from the crime scene and even if the testing irrefutably
proves his innocence, there is no automatic exoneration. In the current
system, an inmate with DNA evidence of his innocence still must
either (1) obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence to
have his conviction overturned and to be released from prison, or (2)
seek a writ of habeas corpus in state or federal court if efforts to
obtain relief in state court have been exhausted. 92 Both of these
options are difficult, due to considerable procedural hurdles and heavy
93
burdens of proof.
Before trial, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crimes
charged. 94 However, because of a presumption that the verdict is
correct and a need for finality, the burden changes in the
postconviction context. After conviction, the burden shifts to the
this reason, even if courts did consider the denial of DNA testing to be a due process violation,
inmates still would be unable to raise that issue in postconviction proceedings if they had not
done so on appeal. But see Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing an example
of a recent case holding that inmates do have a constitutional right to DNA testing of evidence
that could be used to prove their innocence); see infra note 245 (explaining that the Act, if
implemented, would make it a due process violation to deny an inmate the right to DNA testing).
90. See, e.g., John E. Smialik et al., The Microscopic Slide; DNA in Criminal Investigations,
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 1, 2000, at 18 (describing the importance of DNA evidence
both to incriminate and to exonerate and the difficulties of proper collection and testing).
91. Id. (providing guidelines for ensuring against contamination of collected DNA evidence).
92. Several states have recently enacted the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which
provides procedures by which an inmate can seek to have his conviction reexamined. UNIF. POSTCONVICTION PROC. ACT (2001). The Act provides a different set of postconviction relief procedures
for death row inmates and includes a provision for appointed counsel for indigent inmates
pursuing postconviction relief. Id. See generally David DeFoore, Postconviction DNA Testing: A
Cry for Justice from the Wrongly Convicted, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 491, 502-14 (2002) (explaining
these two avenues for postconviction relief).
93. See generally ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7 (explaining that the burden of proof
after trial rests entirely on the inmate pursuing postconviction relief).
94. Id.
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defendant to show that new evidence, which was "not reasonably
discoverable at the time of trial" and which would have been
conclusive at trial, is now available. 95 In addition, the inmate often
must show a constitutional violation to obtain postconviction relief.96
Even constitutional violations are permitted as long as they are
"harmless."97 Some states require a convicted defendant to show both
that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the case
and that he exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain the
evidence before trial. 98 It is difficult for a convicted defendant to prove
that he diligently attempted to obtain DNA testing of forensic
evidence before trial-especially if DNA analysis was not an option at
the time of his trial. 99 In addition, because the denial of a motion for a
new trial is only reversible for abuse of discretion, a convicted
individual usually gets only one chance to meet this difficult burden of
proof. 100
Obtaining representation is another major hurdle to
overturning a conviction. Indigent defendants have a constitutional
right to effective counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 10 ' If defendants are convicted, their options
immediately become more limited. The Supreme Court has held that
indigent inmates do not have the right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings, because a postconviction proceeding is considered to be
civil in nature rather than part of the criminal proceeding. 10 2 This
95. See generally DeFoore, supra note 92, at 493 (outlining the difficulties of obtaining
postconviction relief).
96. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-1 (West 1992).
97. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1992) (relaxing the standard for
what constitutes harmless error in federal habeas proceedings); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,
221-22 (1988) (granting relief after prosecutorial misconduct in jury selection); see also supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
98. Hart, supra note 36, at 632 (describing the standard for granting a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence in Arkansas); see also DeFoore, supra note 92, at 502-06 (defining
"newly discovered evidence" and explaining that all states allow motions for new trials based on
newly discovered evidence but that their procedures for such motions vary widely).
99. Because of these heightened standards, motions for new trials based on newly
discovered evidence are rarely granted. But see, e.g., People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330,
1336 (Ill. 1996) (granting a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence that
someone else murdered the victim, even though such a claim of actual innocence would not be
cognizable as a habeas petition); People v. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (allowing
DNA testing nine years after the inmate's conviction and vacating the sentence when the
evidence proved exculpatory).
100. Hart, supra note 36, at 632.
101. Gideon v. Washington, 372 U.S. 335, 339-340 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357-58 (1963).
102. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). "States have no obligation to provide
postconviction relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process
Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well." Id.
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limitation on the constitutional right to counsel applies to both capital
and noncapital defendants seeking postconviction review of their
original trials.10 3 Therefore, after one direct appeal, an indigent
defendant is left without the assistance of counsel, even if new
evidence or scientific tests are later made available. 10 4 An inmate in
this position can only hope for the intervention of a volunteer lawyer
or an advocacy group.
Some state statutes, however, do provide for the appointment
and compensation of counsel for indigent inmates seeking
postconviction review. Some of these statutes were enacted for the
states to receive federal benefits under the AEDPA rather than to
provide benefits to indigent criminal defendants. 10 5 In addition, if the
initial court-appointed counsel negligently failed to prevent the
defendant's wrongful conviction, it is unlikely that that same court
06
will appoint more capable counsel in the postconviction context.'
Many death row inmates therefore have no attorney or an inadequate
attorney, limiting their opportunities to discover new evidence and
10 7
comply with time limits for filing a motion for a new trial.
Inadequate or nonexistent representation is particularly problematic
for an inmate seeking DNA testing, since it is unlikely that the inmate
has funds available to pay for the testing.'0 8 Inadequate
103. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (describing and upholding Virginia's system
of providing death row inmates seeking habeas corpus review with law books rather than
lawyers).
104. The problematic lack of guaranteed postconviction counsel is illustrated by those
individuals convicted in cases involving forensic evidence prior to the advent of DNA analysis
technology. These individuals, without representation, do not necessarily have the means to
obtain the same type of testing of crime scene evidence that would occur if they were under
investigation today. In addition, these individuals will be unable to benefit from any future
scientific advances which may increase the accuracy of DNA tests or allow such tests to be
performed on smaller samples of biological evidence.
105. Murray, supra note 104 (providing examples of state statutes enacted immediately after
the AEDPA to take advantage of federal benefits); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2261 (2000). The
fact that the AEDPA is the motivation behind many of these state statutes is relevant for at least
two reasons. First, even though defense counsel is made more available regardless of the
motivation for enacting the statutes, it would be more laudable, in terms of abstract justice, for
states to enact such legislation to address the problem of inadequate postconviction
representation rather than to buy into a federal carrot-and-stick scheme. Second, state statutes
enacted to gain federal benefits from a relatively unrelated statutory scheme are more
vulnerable than those enacted by state legislatures for more legitimate, directly related reasons.
If the AEDPA were significantly amended or even repealed, the benefits would disappear,
leaving states back at their starting point.
106. See Di Guilio, supra note 66. Requiring appointed defense counsel to meet strict
competency standards, especially in capital cases and postconviction proceedings, would help to
alleviate this problem.
107. See ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7 (noting that many death row inmates in
leading death penalty states, including Texas and California, have no legal representation).
108. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III (Kirk Bloodsworth Case Study).
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representation at the trial and appellate levels can lead to wrongful
convictions, and a lack of representation at the postconviction stage
then allows those wrongful convictions to remain undetected. Capital
defendants who had ineffective defense counsel at trial and who are
seeking to prove their innocence in a state with no provision for
postconviction representation are denied the protections of the system
not once, but twice.
In addition to the heightened burdens of proof that an inmate
must overcome to overturn her conviction, there are restrictive time
limits for filing a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. 10 9 Many states have time limits of thirty or sixty days, and
only nine states have no time limits. 11 0 Because DNA testing of
evidence has only recently become available, many defendants
convicted long ago are procedurally barred under these statutes from
taking advantage of new technology.
Several states and the federal government have recognized the
problems posed by these restrictive statutes and sought to provide for,
or even compel, DNA testing of old evidence. 1 ' Many state courts
consider motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence to
be a means for defendants to overcome injustices committed at trial. 112
However, it is doubtful that the motions can effectively serve such a
purpose given the restrictive time limits and prohibitive burdens of
113
proof involved.
Because of the states' strict time limits on motions for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, inmates may choose to
pursue postconviction review in federal court through the writ of
habeas corpus. 1 4 This option is especially relevant when DNA
109. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22-1202(C) (West 1992) (providing a thirty-day
time limit for claiming newly discovered evidence in a motion for a new trial). Virginia had the
shortest time limit for making a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidencetwenty-one days-until it recently changed the law. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15(b) (2001); see also
DeFoore, supra note 92, at 503 (noting that most states require motions for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence to be made within two years, but that many others have a time limit
of sixty days after conviction); discussion infra Part IV.C (Earl Washington case study).
110. See also Hart, supra note 36, at 635 (describing Arkansas' thirty-day limit on motions
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence and the difficulties of meeting it).
111. See discussion infra Part IV.
112. Hart, supra note 36, at 636-37.
113. In addition, the original impetus behind the restrictive time limits on motions for newly
discovered evidence, which involved the fear of evidence deterioration, are simply not applicable
to evidence from DNA testing. DeFoore, supranote 92, at 505-06.
114. The "Great Writ" is provided for in the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 2. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to remedy wrongful incarcerations. Phaedra
Tanner, Note, Herrera v. Collins: Assuming the Constitution Prohibits the Execution of an
Innocent Person, Is the Needle Worth the Search?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1283, 1286. Since the

Constitution does not actually define the substance of the writ, however, legislatures and courts
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evidence has been obtained and analyzed long after statutory limits
have passed. However, a state prisoner attempting to obtain habeas
corpus review of an innocence claim will have at least as many
problems as one seeking to move for a new trial based on newly
115
discovered evidence.
In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court interpreted the
already narrow right to habeas corpus relief even more restrictively in
the context of claims of actual innocence. 116 In Herrera,the Court held
that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence,
absent a claim of a procedural or constitutional error, cannot be raised
in a habeas corpus petition. 117 The Court justified its holding by
pointing to the disruptive effects of placing federal courts in a position
to correct errors of fact."18 According to the Court, such a prohibition
does not implicate either the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.1 19 Although the Court rejected the defendant's claim, it did not
have struggled to interpret its meaning. Id. Because of its constitutional basis, Congress and the
Court cannot "suspend" the right to habeas corpus review; however, the Court has traditionally
interpreted its scope quite narrowly. Id.
115. For criticisms of and recommendations concerning current federal habeas procedures,
see, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH Row LAWYER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 260 (1997) (criticizing the procedural difficulties of federal habeas corpus law);
Lugosi, supra note 56, at 234-35 (urging the unfettered allowance of federal habeas corpus
review to any petitioner asserting an actual innocence claim).
116. 506 U.S. 390 (1993); see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on
the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death
Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 832-33 (1993) (explaining that the Supreme Court has responded to a
recent proliferation of habeas cases by imposing procedural restrictions to federal review). In
1992, Roger Coleman, who had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial claimed on appeal that he
was innocent and that no court would review his evidence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
755-56 (1991). Because of a late filing, the state court refused to review his claim, and a federal
court also refused to hear his claim because of his procedural default at the state level. Id. at
729-30. The Supreme Court held that he could not complain about his attorney's mistakes since
he was not entitled to an attorney in the first place and allowed his execution to proceed without
reviewing his innocence claims. Id. at 752.
In addition to the restrictions on federal habeas review imposed by Herreraand its progeny,
the AEDPA further curtails the right. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
117. Herrera,506 U.S. at 397-98. In other words, a new claim of actual innocence, even with
evidence, does not necessarily entitle the inmate to federal habeas corpus review. Id.; see also
Tara L. Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring that Innocents Are Not
Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603 (1995) (demonstrating that innocents are executed in the
United States and proposing solutions to the problem, including providing habeas corpus review
for claims of actual innocence based on new facts).
In Herrera, however, the death row inmate's newly discovered evidence was an allegation
that his deceased brother had committed the crimes. 506 U.S. at 397-98. It is unclear whether
DNA evidence excluding the death row inmate from culpability would be distinguishable based
on its scientific certainty.
118. Herrera,506 U.S. at 400.
119. Id. at 397-98.
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address the question of whether or not executing an innocent person
violated the Eighth Amendment-a question that seems to have an
obvious answer, even to proponents of capital punishment. 20 The
concurring and dissenting opinions in Herrera,however, indicated a
willingness to address claims of actual innocence under habeas corpus
review. 121
Instead of allowing the defendant's claim of actual innocence to
proceed, the Court in Herrera ruled that the "fail-safe" clemency
process was the inmate's only opportunity to present his claims of
innocence.' 22 Grants of clemency are extremely rare in death penalty
cases, however, and the procedures required for clemency vary in each
state.1 23 In addition, both the gubernatorial and presidential clemency
processes necessarily implicate political considerations which can
delay and taint the process.124 Because the clemency process is
discretionary, there is no guarantee that an innocent inmate will have
his claim heard at all.' 25 The process is therefore not an adequate
safeguard against executing the innocent.
There are additional obstacles to obtaining habeas corpus
review for those death row inmates whose trials were arguably
constitutionally defective because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 26 For a capital petitioner to obtain federal habeas corpus
review, counsel must have raised all possible claims in state court and
complied with all state procedural rules.' 27 Ineffective assistance of
counsel at the trial stage therefore can lead to both erroneous
convictions and to a procedural dead end after conviction. In addition,
similar to the situation in a new trial based on newly discovered

120. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 21, at 469-70 (describing the significant difference between
the imposition of the death penalty and any other form of punishment and noting that even those
who support capital punishment do not support its imposition against the innocent); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
121. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 415.
123. See ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7.

124. See id. (explaining that the impact of politics on clemency requests leads to most
commutations being granted as a governor or the President is leaving office); see also Hart, supra
note 36, at 641. Clemency petitions are often subject to arbitrary procedures, and governors
usually do not have the time to investigate or consider them fully. See DeFoore, supra note 92, at
493 (mentioning the impact of politics on the clemency process, as well as governors' doubts
about the propriety of the clemency power). But see Associated Press, supra note 17 (noting
former Illinois Governor George Ryan's recent commutation of all 156 death sentences being
served in that state).
125. Hart, supra note 36, at 641.
126. See discussion supra Part II.C.
127. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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evidence, the petitioner has a high postconviction standard to meet to
128
overturn his conviction in a federal habeas proceeding.
As a result of these barriers to innocence claims, inmates
pursuing federal habeas corpus relief may be more likely to rely upon
procedural mistakes creating due process violations at trial to attempt
to overturn their convictions. Arguably, then, those death row inmates
whose trials were constitutionally defective in the procedural sense
may be in a better position to have their convictions and sentences
reviewed. Like the recent exemption of mentally incompetent
individuals from the death penalty, 129 allowing inmates to pursue
claims of innocence poses problems of cost, delay, and finality. Such an
allowance would encourage most, if not all, death row defendants to
pursue claims of actual innocence, which could risk clogging the
judiciary with potentially meritless claims. The increasing evidence
that the criminal justice system has executed innocent individuals and
will continue to do so, however, justifies extensive change because the
risks of continuing to execute the innocent outweigh the possible
130
associated costs.
IV. CASE STUDIES-INNOCENTS CONVICTED AND RELEASED
Three case studies shed light on particular problems inmates
face when trying to procure DNA testing and postconviction relief and
those faced later by released innocents trying to readjust to normal
life. 13' These stories reveal that the recent increase in exonerations is
a result of the persistent advocacy of private individuals and groups
rather than an indication that the appellate system is working
properly. In addition, these case studies indicate that those
128. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1992) (denying federal habeas corpus
relief because petitioner inmate failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that but for the
constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible
for the death penalty under applicable state law).
129. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002).
130. These costs include the purported loss of an effective deterrent, the expense of
increasing inmates' access to counsel and to DNA testing, and the risk of delegitimizing the
judicial system through increased ex post scrutiny of its convictions. Yet numerous
commentators have noted that capital punishment is more expensive for the State than life
imprisonment. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(explaining that the procedural strictures and complicated appeals that accompany death
sentences make capital punishment more expensive per inmate than sentences of life
imprisonment); see also Costs of the Death Penalty, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington,
D.C., Jan. 24, 2003) (providing the costs of the death penalty), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs2.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
131. For further examples of innocents convicted and later exonerated, see, e.g., DWYER ET
AL., supra note 6; MICHAEL MELLO, THE WRONG MAN: A TRUE STORY OF INNOCENCE ON DEATH

Row (2001).
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individuals whose convictions are overturned due to evidence of actual
innocence usually receive nothing to compensate them for their lost
years. The system that failed them by wrongfully convicting them
thus fails them a second time by not acting to remedy its identified
mistakes.
A. Kirk Bloodsworth
In 1993, Kirk Bloodsworth became the first person in the
nation to be released from death row pursuant to exculpatory DNA
evidence. 13 2 Bloodsworth was thirty-nine years old at the time and had
been in prison for eight years for the 1984 rape and murder of a young
girl. 133 He had spent two of those years on death row before his
sentence was commuted to life.134 The case against Bloodsworth rested
on a questionable identification-five individuals, two of whom were
children, thought he might have been the man that they saw with the
victim prior to her death.1 35 At the time of the trial, Bloodsworth had
no criminal record. 136 Because a judge ruled that the prosecution had
wrongfully withheld evidence about another suspect, Bloodsworth was
fortunate enough to obtain a new trial, at which he received a life
sentence. 137 Bloodsworth continued to maintain his innocence and
38
sought to prove it while in prison.'
Although tests were conducted on forensic evidence from the
crime scene at the time of Bloodsworth's trial, the tests were not yet
39
sophisticated enough to detect and identify DNA from the criminal.
A volunteer lawyer helped Bloodsworth have the evidence tested again
in 1993, using new DNA analysis techniques that had not been
available at the time of his trial. 40 Bloodsworth's attorney paid the
$10,000 testing fee himself.'4 ' The DNA tests showed that
Bloodsworth could not have committed the crime, and further FBI
132. Costs of the Death Penalty, supra note 130; see also DWYER ET AL., supra note 6,
at 216-17.
133. DWYER ET AL., supra note 6, at, 222.
134. Id.
135. ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7.

136. Life After Death Row: Picking up the Pieces After Being Wrongfully Convicted,
ABCNEWS.COM, Aug. 29, 2001, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/Downtown/2020/Downtown_010829_nightshift.feature.htm Oast visited Feb. 28, 2003).
137. Raju Chebium, Kirk Bloodsworth, Twice Convicted of Rape and Murder, Exonerated by
DNA Evidence, CNN.COM, June 20, 2000, available at http://www7.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/02/bloodsworth.profile (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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tests confirmed the results. 142 The murder for which Bloodsworth was
wrongfully convicted remains unsolved to this day. 143 The prosecution
from Bloodsworth's case is still unsure whether or not he is actually
1 44
innocent of the crime.
Unlike most released innocents, 145 Bloodsworth did receive
$300,000 in compensation for lost wages pursuant to a Maryland
wrongful imprisonment statute. 146 This amount was based on a rough
estimate of his lost wages-$30,000 a year for each year between his
arrest and release.147 As another part of the arrangement,
Bloodsworth had to sign an agreement not to sue the state. 148
Although Bloodsworth's attorney advised him not to accept the
amount because it was too low and did not take into account pain and
suffering or emotional distress damages, Bloodsworth was tired of
fighting the system and ready to resume a normal life. 149 He accepted
the money, purchased a boat, and now spends his time as a
commercial crab fisherman in the Chesapeake Bay. 150 He got married
soon after his release and is now living the life he dreamed of during
his time in prison. 151 Bloodsworth also works as an advocate for
prisoners' rights and has voiced his support for the proposed
52
Innocence Protection Act.
The discovery of Bloodsworth's innocence and his subsequent
release was due more to persistence and generous volunteers than to
the workings of the criminal justice system. 153 Because Maryland's
time limit for asserting new evidence is one year after the time at
which the judgment becomes final, only the fortuitous combination of
scientific advances and an attorney's persistence led to Bloodsworth's
release after nine years on death row. 54 Most death row inmates lack
the legal and financial resources to pursue claims of actual innocence

142. Id.

143. Id.
144. Id.

145. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
146. Chebium, supra note 137; see also DWYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 220.

147. Chebium, supra note 137.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. See Lugosi, supra note 56, at 265, 268-69 (describing Bloodsworth's testimony to the
Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee about his story and his belief in the need
for compensation for exonerated innocents); see also discussion infra Part V.C (mentioning
Bloodsworth's testimony in support of the Innocence Protection Act).
153. See ASSESSING THE DANGER, supra note 7.

154. Id.
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on their own. 155 In addition, even with volunteer attorneys and
innocence projects assuming substantial caseloads, demand for these
services remains greater than supply. 156 Most death row inmates are
therefore unlikely to benefit from the factors that led to exoneration
57
for Bloodsworth.'
B. Charles Fain
Charles Fain, a Vietnam veteran, was wrongfully imprisoned
on death row in Idaho for more than eighteen years as a result of false
testimony and incorrect hair analysis evidence. 158 He had been
convicted and sentenced to death for the 1982 kidnapping, sexual
assault, and drowning of nine-year-old Daralyn Johnson. 59 The girl's
16
brutal murder shocked the small community where it occurred. 0
After investigating the case for seven months, the police were at an
61
impasse-until they found Fain and called him for questioning.'
Fain was considered a suspect because of his light brown hair, because
his residence was a block from the girl's house, and because he had
difficulty holding a job. 162 Although a state polygraph examiner
concluded that Fain was telling the truth when he denied involvement
in the rape and murder, the prosecution successfully objected to
introduction of the test as evidence. 163 The case against Fain rested on
two questionable sources of evidence. First, an FBI forensic scientist
testified that a microscopic analysis of the hairs found on the victim's
clothing revealed that they might have belonged to Fain. 16 4 Second,
two jailhouse informers claimed that Fain had confessed to the crime
65
in graphic detail.'

155. See Chebium, supra note 5 (stating that the demand for Innocence Project services far
exceeds the supply).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Raymond Bonner, Death Row Inmate Is Freed After DNA Test Clears Him, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2001, at All.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Many men had given hair samples, and apparently Fain's hair sample resembled those
found on the victim the most closely. Id.; see also Innocence: Freed from Death Row, supra note 4
(recounting Charles Fain's story).
165. Bonner, supra note 158. It is unclear why the informers in Fain's case gave false
testimony, but jailhouse informers often manipulate the system by cooperating with the
authorities to gain favor with them. Id.
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During his time in prison, Fain consistently maintained his
innocence, claiming that he was in Oregon at the time of the
murder. 166 In March 2000, a federal district court judge ordered that
additional forensic testing be conducted on the hairs. 167 While
microscopic hair analysis was the most advanced type of forensic
testing available at the time of his conviction, DNA testing had since
become a possibility. The DNA tests revealed that the hairs had not
come from Fain, and his conviction was set aside. 168 Fain, who is now
fifty-four years old, was released with all charges dismissed in 2001.169
His release ultimately was the result of one persistent attorney's work
on the case for more than a decade and a federal judge's willingness to
order DNA testing and authorize the funds to pay for it.170 Both the
original prosecutor in Fain's case and the trial judge remain
unconvinced of his innocence, however, in spite of the DNA tests that
fully exonerated him. 171 During his eighteen years in prison, Fain's
parents both passed away. 172 At the time of his release, he was unsure
173
what he would do for work or where he would live.
C. Earl Washington
In 1983, Earl Washington was arrested for breaking into the
home of an elderly woman, stealing a gun and money from her, and
beating her. 174 He pled guilty to statutory burglary and malicious
wrongdoing and was sentenced to thirty years in prison for those
crimes. 175 While Washington was in custody, the police questioned him
about five other crimes.1 76 Washington confessed to all five of the other
crimes, but in four of them, his confession was so inconsistent with the

166. Id.
167. Id.; see also Innocence: Freed from Death Row, supra note 4.
168. Bonner, supra note 158.
169. Id.; see also American Released from Death Row, BBC NEWS (telling the story of Charles
Fain's conviction and release), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1508636.stm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
170. Bonner, supra note 158.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1103 (2001)
(citing Press Release, Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Statement of Governor
Gilmore Regarding Earl Washington (June 1, 2000)).
175. Id.
176. Id.at 1091.
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crime reported that his confessions were rejected by the State. 177
Washington, who has an I.Q. of sixty-nine and the mental age of a tenyear-old, apparently had confessed to the crimes to please the police
officers who questioned him. 178 In the interrogation, police failed to
account for the fact that Washington's normal method of coping with
179
the world was to agree with those around him.
Surprisingly, the State pursued Washington's "confession" to
the 1982 rape and murder of Rebecca Williams, even though it
rejected the other four confessions obtained from him. 180 The police
pursued the interrogation in spite of Washington's inconsistencies on
important points surrounding the Williams murder. 18 1 In fact, when
the police drove Washington to the scene of the crime, he mistakenly
identified an apartment on the other side of the complex as the
182
location of the rape and murder.
This confession to the crime eventually led to a capital murder
charge and conviction, even though no forensic evidence tied
Washington to the crime scene. 183 In addition to this "confession,"
several factors contributed to Washington's conviction. Washington's
mental state and the questionable quality of the assistance provided
by his defense counsel made conviction almost a forgone conclusion at
trial. 184 At the sentencing phase, one aggravating factor, that "the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," led
to the imposition of the death penalty.185 Washington's direct appeal,
which was handled by his trial lawyer, was denied. 186 Although the
next step in the postconviction process was the filing of a state habeas
corpus petition, Washington had no representation after his direct
appeal.187
177. Id. at 1091-92. For example, Washington apparently originally told police that the
victim in one of the crimes to which he confessed was black, but then said that she was white
after the police indicated that his first answer was incorrect.
178. Frances X. Clines, New DNA Tests Are Seen as Key to Virginia Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2000.
179. Freedman, supra note 174, at 1095.
180. Clines, supra note 178.
181. Freedman, supra note 174 at 1092-93.
182. Id. at 1094.
183. Id. at 1094-95.
184. Id. at 1095-96.
185. Id. 1096-97. The application of this aggravating factor in this case seems intuitively
illogical, since the gravity of the underlying offense should only be relevant when culpability for
that offense is absolutely certain.
186. Id. at 1097.

187. Id. Virginia, like most states, did not appoint counsel for postconviction proceedings.
This has now changed as a result of recent statutory amendments. See Kathryn Roe Eldridge &
Matthew L. Engle, Case Note, Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.4.1, Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-237.1 to 19.2-
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In Washington's case, it was only the advocacy of another
inmate and the subsequent intervention of private attorneys that
finally led to reversal.18 8 These attorneys quickly compiled a state
habeas corpus petition, and the local federal judge granted his stay of
execution.189 With only nine days before Washington's scheduled
execution, even after the stay was granted, a team of volunteer
lawyers took over the case. 190 One of them discovered exculpatory
semen stain evidence that had been in government custody since
Washington's initial trial ten years earlier. 191 In spite of the evidence
of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, the state habeas petition
was not granted, since the court found the errors to be nonprejudicial
in light of Washington's confession to the crime.' 92
Because DNA testing had become available, Washington's team
of volunteer lawyers arranged to have the semen stain tested.1 93 The
exculpatory results were included in a pardon petition to the governor
of Virginia. 94 However, because DNA test results were not accepted
as undeniably accurate in 1994, the governor simply commuted
Washington's sentence to life without fully exonerating him. 195 The
improvements in DNA technology between 1994 and 2000 led to a
reexamination of the case. 196 In October 2001, after intense media
pressure, Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia granted Washington an
absolute pardon after DNA testing completely exonerated him.1 9 7 As
an example of the extraordinary efficacy and utility of DNA testing,
the sample which exonerated Washington simultaneously pegged the
killer. 198 Washington was finally released from prison in February
2001 after serving time on another conviction. 99 Washington, who was
forty years old at the time of his release, had served eighteen years in
237.6 (Michie Supp. 2001), 14 CAP. DEF. J. 217, 217 (2001) (describing the 2001 statutory
changes, including the creation of a "writ of actual innocence," which provides death row inmates
with the right to obtain representation and to file a petition claiming actual innocence to the
Virginia Supreme Court).
188. Id. at 1098.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1099.
192. Id. (citing Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1475 (4th Cir. 1991)).
193. Id. at 1100.
194. Id.
195. Press Release, supra note 174. At the time, Governor Douglas Wilder was seeking a seat
in the Senate and issued the commutation hours before the end of his term in office. Id.
196. Id.
197. Frances X. Clines, FurorAnew with Release of Man Who Was Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2001, at A23.
198. Freedman, supra note 174, at 1103.
199. Clines, supra note 197, at A23.
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prison-almost ten of them on death row. 200 He is the only prisoner
20 1
from Virginia's death row who has ever been exonerated.
The volunteer legal services which led to Washington's release
were worth an estimated ten million dollars. 20 2 Since his release from
prison, he has been living in an apartment in Virginia Beach. 20 3 The
state has done nothing to compensate him for his wrongful
imprisonment or to compensate the individuals who worked for his
release. 20 4 Washington initially said that he was only interested in an
apology from the state. 20 5 However, he recently instituted legal action
against the deputies, sheriff, and the county involved in his conviction
alleging that the deputies and investigators involved in his case
coerced a confession from him and ignored or concealed evidence
20 6
pointing to the real killer.
V.

PROPOSED SYSTEMIC CHANGES TO PREVENT WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS

At both the state and the federal level, private groups and
public advocates are working to prevent future wrongful
convictions. 207 While the innocence projects may be the most heavily
publicized of these efforts, state governments have also begun to
address the problem, both by conducting fairness studies and by
20 8
improving inmates' access to DNA testing of forensic evidence.
Although there is now increasing focus on the fairness of the death
penalty as administered, states have yet to address the problem of
wrongful convictions from the other side. No states have renewed their
200. Id.
201. Maria Glod, Those Who Felt Injustice Call for a Fairer System: Ex-Convicts Testify
Before Senate Panel to Support Standardsfor Lawyers in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, June 28,
2001, at B02.
202. Clines, supra note 197, at A23.
203. Associated Press, DNA Testing Frees Virginia Death Row Inmate, CNN.COM, Feb. 11,
2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/ll/virginia.death.penalty/index.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
204. Id. Washington's release did lead to considerable reform of Virginia law on
postconviction proceedings and the preservation of biological evidence. See generally Eldridge &
Engle, supranote 187.
205. Associated Press, supra note 203.
206. Scott Shenk, Earl Washington Sues: Former Deputies, Sheriff and County Are
Defendants, FAUQUIER CITIZEN (Fauquier, Virginia), Oct. 10, 2002, available at http://www.citizenet.com/news/articles/101002/law-orderl.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). According to the
complaint, Washington's conviction was "the result of a concerted effort by law enforcement
Id. The lawsuit does not seek a specified dollar amount of
officers... to convict him.
damages. Id.
207. See discussion infra Parts V.A-C.
208. Id.
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wrongful imprisonment statutes to address the problems of the
increased numbers of released innocents or to provide them with
restitution or assistance, although the proposed Innocence Protection
20 9
Act would address that problem to some extent.
A. Death Penalty Reform in the States
Several states have recently enacted or proposed moratoria on
capital punishment pending studies of the fairness of death penalty
statutes and their application. 21 0 Following thirteen exonerations of
death row inmates, Illinois placed a moratorium on capital

punishment in January

2000.211

A commission was then established to

study the efficacy and fairness of the death penalty as administered in
that state.2 12 Last spring the commission issued a report providing
eighty-five changes which could lead to the prevention of wrongful
executions but concluding that "[n]o system, given human nature and
frailties, could ever be devised or constructed that would work
perfectly and guarantee absolutely that no innocent person is ever
again sentenced to death."2 13 Maryland also enacted a moratorium,
based in part on the public reaction to Kirk Bloodsworth's story, but
the state's new governor recently rescinded the moratorium. 214 The
Kansas Supreme Court overturned all four death row inmates'
sentences after holding that the state's death penalty statute was

209. See, e.g., Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12.
210. Id.
211. See discussion supra Part I (describing recent events in Illinois); Interview: Scott Turow
Talks About His Experience on Illinois' Commission for Death Penalty Review (NPR radio
broadcast, Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter NPR Interview].
212. NPR Interview, supra note 211. Only four members of the fourteen-person commission
initially opposed capital punishment, but the group recently voted eight-to-six against the death
penalty. Id.
213. Jodi Wilgoren, Panel in Illinois Seeks to Reform Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2002, at Al (noting that the proposed reforms include requiring videotaping of all interrogations
in capital cases, creating a state DNA database, and creating an independent state forensics lab).
The report also recommended disallowing capital punishment in cases in which conviction is
obtained by a single eyewitness's testimony. Id.
214. Maryland Death Penalty Moratorium, CBSNEWS.COM, May 9, 2002 (noting that
Governor Parris Glendening declared a temporary death penalty moratorium citing "reasonable
questions" about the application of capital punishment in Maryland and throughout the United
States), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/O9/politics/main508491.shtml (last
visited Mar. 18, 2003). There were thirteen men awaiting execution in Maryland when the
moratorium was imposed. Id.; cf. Lori Montgomery, Death Penalty Study Now Has Ehrlich's
Attention, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at SM05 (noting that the new governor, after rescinding the
moratorium, was alerted to a study on disparities in the imposition of the death penalty by
Lieutenant Governor Michael S. Steele, an African-American death penalty opponent).
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impermissibly flawed. 215 Six other states have initiated capital
punishment studies which are examining the competence of defense
216
counsel and the fairness of the application of the death penalty.
These studies were prompted by increasing evidence of wrongful
convictions in those states. 21 7 Even in states which have not initiated
death penalty studies, private groups and lawmakers are increasingly
calling for such studies or for the outright abolition of capital
punishment. 2 18 Legislation calling for moratoria or the abolition of
capital punishment was introduced in eighteen states and the federal
government in 2001, and those measures nearly passed in several of
21 9
those states.
An area of recent state reform activity involves the
disproportionate number of mentally impaired individuals on death
row nationwide. 220 A relatively high percentage of the death row
inmates who have been exonerated in recent years are mentally
impaired individuals. 22' Many states were considering statutes to
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded, and eighteen states
had already done so when the Supreme Court recently decided Atkins

215. What's New, DPIC (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Jan. 24, 2003), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/whatsnew.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with
author).
216. Associated Press, supra note 203. In addition to Illinois, the states studying the fairness
of capital punishment include Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, and North Carolina.
217. Key Factsat a Glance: Executions, supra note 12.
218. See, e.g., Herman J. Hoying, A Positive First Step: The Joint Legislative Audit Review
Committee's Review of Virginia's System of Capital Punishment, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 349 (2002); Key
Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12.
219. Key Factsat a Glance: Executions, supra note 12.
220. About ten percent of the prisoners on death row are mentally retarded, which means
they have I.Q. scores of less than seventy. Cowan, supra note 34, at 12. Since 1976, thirty-five
mentally retarded individuals have been executed. Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.C (Earl
Washington case study). In many states, for example, inmates pursuing postconviction relief are
provided with law books but not lawyers. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985) (providing an
example of a case in which a defendant's inadequate counsel and his mental incompetence
rendered his trial unfair but in which his counsel was nevertheless found effective, and his
conviction was upheld)).
221. See, e.g., Steven M. Pincus, It's Good to Be Free: An Essay About the Exoneration of
Albert Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 27, 33-34 (2001) (explaining that prosecutors concealed
evidence of Burrell's history of mental retardation and mental illness at trial). Other factors
which contributed to Burrell's wrongful conviction included further undisclosed evidence,
undisclosed inconsistent witness statements, and false incriminating testimony. Id. at 34-47.
Burrell is currently seeking compensation for his wrongful imprisonment, but he has not been
successful on those claims. Tom Guarisco, Compensation Sought for Ex-inmate; Sister Says Freed
Man Needs Help, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), May 23, 2001, at B1. Burrell has been attempting to
readapt to freedom since his release, but he has been unable to find employment and has not
been compensated by the state for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. Id.; see also
discussion infra Part IV.C (Earl Washington case study).
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v. Virginia.222 In Atkins, the Court reversed its prior holding in Penry
v. Lynaugh and found that the execution of a mentally incompetent
individual violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. 223 The Atkins decision immediately halted the
upcoming executions of an estimated 160 inmates on death rows
nationwide.224
Other recent state actions to improve the fairness of capital
punishment include the prohibition of the execution of juveniles, the
elimination of methods of capital punishment other than lethal
injection, and improvement of access to defense counsel for death row
inmates. 225
B. Improved Access to DNA Testing and the Creation of DNA
Databases
Many states are improving access to DNA testing for inmates
and the accused. 226 Such improved access may encompass the right to
DNA testing for all incarcerated and accused individuals or provide
longer statutes of limitations for introducing newly discovered
evidence. 227 All fifty states currently have statutes requiring the
collection of DNA samples from certain classes of criminals and the
222. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002); David Firestone, Georgia Will Not
Execute Mentally Ill Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/national/26EXEC.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003); Key Facts at a Glance:
Executions, supra note 12 (describing the death penalty reforms initiated and enacted
nationwide in 2001).
223. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (rejecting, by plurality, defendant's claim
that executing a mentally retarded individual was a violation of the Eighth Amendment); Atkins,
536 U.S. at 350 (overturning Penry and banning the execution of the mentally retarded as
contrary to the "evolving standards of decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishment"). See generally Oliver Kaufman, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Is
Executing the Mentally Retarded Constitutional?,85 MARQ. L. REV. 579 (2001).
224. Crime and Punishment: The Death Penalty Becomes a High-Profile Issue, supra note 9,
at 36.
225. Changes in the Death Penalty Around the U.S., 2000-01; Changes in the Death Penalty
Around the U.S., 2001-02; Changes in the Death Penalty Around the U.S., 2002-03, DPIC (Death
Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last
visited Jan. 5, 2003); see also Tabak, supra note 6, at 739 (describing recent state actions
concerning capital punishment, including moratoria in Illinois and Nebraska); Death Penalty
Information Center, 2001 Year End Report, supra note 12 (describing state efforts to improve
access to defense counsel in capital cases in 2001).
226. In 2001, seventeen states enacted legislation providing inmates with greater access to
postconviction DNA testing. Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, supra note 12; see, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-9-10 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2001); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2001). However, some of these statutes retain fairly high limits as to
when exactly DNA testing is available and when the results of the testing may be introduced at
trial or in a postconviction proceeding.
227. Death Penalty Information Center, Year End Report 2001, supra note 12.
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maintenance of DNA databases using these samples. 228 Such
databases have been effective both for identifying criminals and for
exonerating the innocent. 229 Law enforcement officers can access these
databases to match DNA profiles from crime scenes with those of
known offenders in the state databases, often resulting in "cold hits,"
when the criminal's identity is determined without any other
evidence.
Critics of DNA and DNA databases point to the invasion of
privacy involved and to the possibility of their use for discriminatory
genetic profiling. 230 There are also those who argue the contrary
position-that a nationwide DNA database would be the most effective
means of combating the possibility of law enforcement discrimination
based on race or ethnicity. 231 The Supreme Court has yet to address
the issue, but state courts have upheld the constitutionality of DNA
collection and DNA databases. 232 Although privacy concerns are
legitimate, such fears are outweighed by the need to curtail the
obvious and already realized risk of convicting and even executing the
innocent.

228. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2001) (providing for DNA testing
requests by current prisoners, but the issue of DNA testing must be raised at trial after 2002);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240 (2000) (allowing for postconviction DNA testing for prisoners meeting
fairly strict requirements); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2001) (providing inmates the
right to DNA testing where the results will potentially be materially relevant); see also Michelle
Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 767, 767 (1999).
229. Smialik et al., supra note 90, at 18.
230. See Hibbert, supra note 228, at 767 (arguing that misplaced reliance on DNA testing in
certain cases can lead to erroneous exonerations and proposing limits to decrease the possibility
of DNA databases being used for invasions of privacy and genetic profiling); David M.
Halbfinger, Police Dragnets for DNA Tests Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at Al
(discussing criticism of broad DNA dragnets, including their Fourth Amendment search and
Fifth Amendment coercion and self-incrimination implications, as well as their supposedly
limited utility and high expense). Compare David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data
Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 183-84 (2001) (advocating the creation of
DNA databanks, but noting serious constitutional and privacy concerns implicated by such
databanks), with Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding
the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001) (outlining
necessary procedural safeguards to accompany the creation of DNA databanks).
231. David H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA IdentificationDatabase in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST.
4 (2001) (advocating the creation of a nationwide DNA database in order to aid crime prevention
by identification and deterrence). Both of these competing positions implicitly acknowledge that
an all-or-nothing approach to gathering DNA evidence from the accused is necessary to avoid
discrimination.
232. See Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that states have a
compelling Fourth Amendment interest in promoting DNA testing and creating state DNA
databases). In Patterson,the court found that states have an interest in exonerating the innocent
that outweighs the right to privacy. Id. Thus, the court stated that a search warrant is not
required for officers to reuse a validly obtained DNA sample. Id.
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In addition to these efforts at the state level, recently enacted
federal statutes provide for mandatory DNA testing of all federal
inmates, including those on parole. 233 These DNA samples are then
compiled into a federal database-the Combined DNA Index System
("CODIS"). 23 4 State and local forensic laboratories maintain their
collections of DNA profiles on a computer database. 235 This database
includes DNA samples from both convicted felons and unsolved
crimes. 236 Crime scene investigators then can test DNA evidence
against the profiles in the database, even in cases in which they have
no other evidence of the criminal. 237 The databases reduce the time
238
and expense associated with a normal investigation of the crime.
These databases could be even more effective were it not for a
2 39
substantial backlog in DNA testing and in updating the database.
240
There have been recent federal efforts to eliminate this backlog.
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the Department of
Justice will provide grants to state crime labs to reduce their DNA
testing and compilation backlogs. 2 41 The problem is enormous, with
hundreds of thousands of DNA samples waiting to be tested in crime
labs across the country. 242 Ashcroft's recent initiative will likely help

233. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a) (2000). An inmate who fails to cooperate with the statutory
collection procedure is guilty of a misdemeanor. § 14135a(a)(5).
234. § 14135a(b). Another provision gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority
to appoint an advisory board to develop and implement quality standards for DNA testing,
forensic laboratories, and forensic scientists. § 14131 ("Quality Assurance and Proficiency
Testing Standards"). A similar statute provides for federal grants to state DNA laboratories
meeting the federal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 3796kk-2 (2000).
235. Smialik et al., supra note 90, at 18.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. (providing several examples of "cold hits" in cases in which there was no
evidence other than the forensic evidence which provided DNA samples); see also Kaye et al.,
supra note 231 (advocating a population-wide DNA database and rebutting anticipated
arguments against such a system). The authors argue that a blanket collection of DNA from the
entire population, beginning with infants, would prevent potential discriminatory collection and
would significantly improve criminal investigations. Id. at 5-6.
239. Demand for DNA Testing Creating National Backlog, CNN.COM, Aug. 30, 2001,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/08/29/dna.backlog/index.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2003). The Justice Department estimates that there are more than 750,000 samples collected
from convicts throughout the country that are waiting to be tested. Id. The average sample is not
tested for six months, and such a delay often surpasses the statute of limitations for prosecuting
the case. Id.
240. Ashcroft Announces Grants to Eliminate State's DNA Testing Backlog, BULL.
FRONTRUNNER, Aug. 2, 2001. Ashcroft said that the delay in testing samples leads to the dual
problems of offenders being released and innocent people remaining in prison. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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to reduce the backlog, and the federal Innocence Protection Act, if
passed, would address the problem even more rapidly.
C. The Innocence ProtectionAct
The federal government is more generally assessing the
fairness of the death penalty and the usefulness of DNA testing of
forensic evidence in criminal investigations and the postconviction
context. 243 In October 2000, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont
introduced the Innocence Protection Act to the Senate ("the Act"). 244
The Act would ensure greater access to competent defense counsel for
death row inmates, improve inmates' access to postconviction DNA
testing, and increase state incentives to preserve DNA evidence. 2 45 To
improve representation of capital defendants, the Act also calls for a
national commission of prosecutors, lawyers, and judges to develop
standards to ensure adequate legal services. 246 It would shift the
authority for appointing defense counsel in capital cases from state
judges to an independent authority. 247 In addition, the Act would
provide for the maintenance of this DNA in a system of linked state
and federal DNA databases and would withhold funding from states
that do not comply with its requirements. 248 Although both the state
243. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL
SURVEY (1988-2000) (2000) (examining apparent patterns of racial discrimination in the
application of the federal death penalty), available at http://www.justice.policy.net/studies/pdfldpsurvey.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
244. S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001). On October 26, 2000, Senator Leahy's nonbinding resolution
calling for states to improve legal representation in capital cases and to provide greater access to
postconviction DNA testing passed as part of Senate Bill 3045, the Paul Coverdell National
Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (2000). For the
House of Representatives version of the Innocence Protection Act, see H.R. 912. In addition to
this development, Senator Russ Feingold recently introduced a bill which would place a
moratorium on the federal death penalty and encourage states to do the same while a National
Commission reviews the fairness of the death penalty. See The National Death Penalty
Moratorium Act of 2001, S. 233, 107th Cong. (2001). Although that measure did not pass, its
introduction demonstrates the recent shift in the death penalty debate. See also Patrick Leahy,
Symposium: Serenity Now or Insanity Later?: The Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on the
Criminal Justice System: Introduction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 605, 606 (2001) (describing the
purposes behind and goals of the Innocence Protection Act).
245. See Leahy, supra note 244, at 606-07; see also Masters, supra note 12, at Al (describing
the major systemic changes proposed in the Innocence Protection Act). Under the Act, it would be
a due process violation to deny prisoners the right to DNA testing of forensic evidence. S. 486; see
also Patrick Leahy, Symposium on the Death Penalty: Reforming a Process Fraught With Error,
The Innocence Protection Act of 2001, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1113-17 (2001) (providing
Senator Leahy's comments on the introduction of the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 in the
U.S. Senate).
246. See Glod, supra note 201.
247. Id.
248. See S. 486, § 101(a)(11).
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and federal systems provide at least some access to DNA testing and
maintain various DNA databases, there is currently no integrated
system combining the DNA data from both state and federal
249
inmates.
VI. RESTORING THE WRONGLY CONVICTED UNDER THE CURRENT
SYSTEM

While the proposed federal Innocence Protection Act is a
starting point for reducing the occurrence of wrongful convictions, it
addresses only one aspect of the problem-that of prevention. 250 The
Act and other proposed statutes aimed at reducing the risk of
wrongful convictions do little for those innocents who have been
rightfully released. To be more effective, any federal statutory scheme
addressing the problem of wrongful convictions should also seek to
increase the availability of restitution for those released-by providing
a comprehensive system to restore exonerated innocents to their
preconviction position in society.
There is currently little in the way of available remedies for
25 1
those individuals who have been wrongly convicted and released.
Current possibilities for individuals seeking restitution for wrongful
incarceration fall into three general categories: (1) actions against the
state pursuant to statutes providing for governmental compensation
for individuals wrongly convicted of and imprisoned for crimes; 252 (2)
wrongful conviction actions brought as claims of violations of state and

249. See id.; see also Glod, supra note 201. Earl Washington and Kirk Bloodsworth were both
present last June to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which was considering the
provisions of the Act which would ensure more competent counsel for capital defendants. Id. The
men testified about the years they spent wrongfully imprisoned on death row and the role that
ineffective assistance of counsel played in their convictions. Id.
250. The Act does recommend greater compensation for federal and state inmates who are
wrongfully convicted and sentenced-especially for wrongful convictions in death penalty cases.
However, the amounts provided in the Act are not necessarily adequate and do not take into
account pain and suffering, emotional distress damages, or exonerated individuals' housing,
rehabilitation, and psychological assistance needs. See S. 486, §§ 301-302.
251. See, e.g., Guarisco, supra note 217, at B1 (explaining Albert Burrell's struggle to adapt
to normal life and to gain compensation for his thirteen years of wrongful imprisonment on death
row). Burrell is mildly mentally retarded and cannot read. Id. Upon his release from prison, the
prison staff gave him ten dollars so that he could get a ride into town. Id.
252. See, e.g., Annotation, Construction and Application of State Statute Providing
Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, 34 A.L.R. 4th 648, 649 (West 2001)
(listing examples of state and federal cases applying state statutes providing compensation to
those wrongly convicted).
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federal constitutions;23 and (3) actions against states based on tort
25 4
liability for false imprisonment.
A. Compensationfor Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment
Some former inmates have prevailed on wrongful conviction
and incarceration claims brought under state statutes, recovering
damages in the form of lost earnings for the period of their
incarceration. 255 Although most states have some form of wrongful
imprisonment or incarceration statute providing the wrongly
convicted with the right to seek restitution, these statutes vary
dramatically. 256 Most do not guarantee restitution but instead impose
substantial barriers to recovery. First, most of these statutes require
that an inmate's original conviction be either overturned or vacated to
recover for wrongful imprisonment. 25 7 To prevail on a claim for
compensation for wrongful imprisonment or incarceration, the inmate
usually must prove that either: (1) the crime alleged did not occur at
all; or (2) that, if the crime did occur, it was committed by someone
else. 258 In some states, a governor's pardon is necessary to overcome

this burden. 259 Cases in which the claimant was later found not guilty
by reason of insanity do not satisfy this requirement. 260 Acquittal from
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
254. See, e.g., Hoffner v. New York, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631-32 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding
that an apology is insufficient restitution for a man who was wrongly imprisoned for twelve
years due to prosecutorial misconduct and awarding him $112,290 in compensatory damages for
false imprisonment). In Hoffner, the court applied a balancing test, taking into account that the
petitioner's earnings would have probably been low, to determine the amount of compensation.
Id. at 632.
255. See Annotation, supra 252, at 649. At least half of the states have statutes providing for
damages for wrongful or false imprisonment, although the statutory requirements vary
dramatically, as do the nature and the extent of relief available upon a successful showing of
wrongful or false imprisonment. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.02 (Anderson 2001)
(requiring that a defendant prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence and that a
wrongful imprisonment action can only be instituted after the original conviction is reversed or
vacated); IOWA CODE § 663A.1 (2001) (requiring that a defendant prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he did not commit the offense or that the offense did not occur and limiting lost
wages recovery to $25,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment); see also Todd Richissin, Austin
Might Face Struggle for Redress; Wrongly Imprisoned Rarely Compensated, Even in Glaring
Cases, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2002, at Al (discussing the case of Michael Austin, who was recently
released from a Maryland prison after twenty-seven years of wrongful imprisonment and who is
now attempting to obtain restitution). Kirk Bloodsworth is apparently the rare example of a
wrongfully imprisoned individual gaining restitution in Maryland. Richissin, supra, at Al.
256. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Annotation, supra note 252, at 651 (citing Ebberts v. State Bd. of Control, 84
Cal. App. 3d 329, 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)). In Ebberts, the California Court of Appeals found:
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a homicide conviction based on justifiable self-defense, on the other
hand, generally satisfies the requirement that the crime did not occur,
261
allowing a wrongful imprisonment claim to proceed.
In addition, the presumption of innocence applied to the
accused during trial is no longer applicable in postconviction
proceedings, even if the inmate has been fully acquitted of the crime
for which he was imprisoned. 262 A released inmate whose conviction
has been either reversed or vacated may still be required to prove his
innocence either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and
convincing evidence. 263 Additional obstacles faced by a former inmate
seeking wrongful imprisonment compensation include obtaining
effective assistance of counsel, paying attorneys' fees and costs, and
overcoming a justifiable distrust and avoidance of the entire judicial
system. 264 In light of the recent increase in exonerations based on
DNA evidence, several states are reconsidering their wrongful
imprisonment statutes, making it easier for the wrongfully convicted
265
to obtain restitution after release.
[T]he claimant's mere denial of the commission of the crime for which he was
convicted, reversal of the judgment of conviction on appeal, acquittal of the claimant
on retrial, or, the failure of the prosecuting authority to retry the claimant for the
crime, may be considered.., but will not be deemed sufficient evidence [of wrongful
conviction] ... [absent] substantial independent corroborating evidence that the
claimant is innocent of the crime charged.
84 Cal. App. 3d at 333; see also Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
wrongful conviction claim could not stand where conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence
without a showing of claimant's innocence).
261. See, e.g., Diola v. State Bd. of Control, 135 Cal. App. 3d 580, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
262. See, e.g., LeFevre v. Goodland, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Wis. 1945):
Neither the presumption of innocence applicable on and during the course of the trial
of every person accused of crime, nor the fact that there was an acquittal of [the
prisoner] upon the reversal on appeal of the judgment of conviction, based on the
verdict of guilty approved by the trial court, can be considered sufficient to establish
or to compel a finding ... that "it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was innocent of the crime."
In LeFevre, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that if the former inmate was not found
innocent beyond a reasonable doubt, he was then prevented from pursuing other possible
remedies for wrongful conviction. See id. at 885-86.
263. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.2 (Anderson 2001) (providing that a released
inmate must have had his original conviction vacated or reversed and must still prove innocence
by a preponderance of the evidence); see also, Annotation, supra note 252, at 653 (outlining
courts' application of state statutes providing compensation for wrongful conviction and
incarceration).
264. See, e.g., discussion supraPart IV.A (Kirk Bloodsworth case study).
265. See generally Changes in Death Penalty Laws Around the U.S.-2000-2003, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STAT. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C., Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=236&scid=40 (last visited Apr. 11, 2003). Such statutes are
applicable to anyone who has been wrongfully convicted and then released. Cowan, supra note
34. However, in cases of DNA exoneration, the former inmate is in a substantially better position
to overcome the burden of proving his innocence by clear and convincing evidence or by a
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B. Federal Causes of Action
Absent a state statute providing a cause of action for wrongful
imprisonment, inmates may bring a federal cause of action for
violations of constitutional due process or equal protection guarantees.
However, federal causes of action also present significant problems for
the newly released inmate. First, the statutes of limitations on such
claims often prevent inmates from pursuing causes of action based on
convictions that occurred many years earlier. 266 The longer the inmate
has been wrongfully imprisoned on death row, the more unlikely it is
that he will be able to bring a claim under § 1983 or another federal
statute. 26 7 Several recent cases have alleviated this problem by
providing that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim can
equitably "toll" during the time that the innocent is in prison,
from
imprisonment
of wrongful
the
duration
preventing
disadvantaging an inmate's right to such a cause of action. 268 In
addition, bringing a cause of action for wrongful conviction
of
compensation under federal law generally bars the possibility 269
recovering for wrongful imprisonment under a state statute.
Bringing a federal habeas claim may also thwart a future claim
against the state for wrongful imprisonment. 270 A released innocent
often must make a difficult legal choice between recovery under state
or federal law before proceeding with a wrongful imprisonment claim.
Finally, once an inmate is proven innocent according to state
statutory standards for wrongful conviction or for the purposes of
federal civil rights statutes, it is still necessary to determine the

preponderance of the evidence. Alabama is considering a proposal to pay wrongfully convicted
individuals $50,000 for each year that they were in prison. Id. Likewise, Florida may compensate
the estate of a death row inmate who died of cancer before being exonerated. Id.
266. See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations is Applicable to Civil Rights
Action Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?, 45 A.L.R. FED. 548, 555 (1979) (stating that federal
courts ordinarily look to the period of limitations applicable to the most closely analogous state
cause of action to determine when a § 1983 suit is time barred).
267. Id.
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Mitchell v. City of Boston, 130 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209, 216 (D.
Mass. 2001) (holding that the statute of limitations on defendant's § 1983 claim tolled until the
favorable termination of the criminal proceedings). In Mitchell, the state civil rights violation
claim did not toll during the defendant's imprisonment. Id. at 209. The defendant also failed to
prove the elements of a malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 215.
269. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 546 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a
wrongfully convicted man who had received full compensation under federal statute could not
also recover under state statute).
270. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 437 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. App. 1969) (holding that a plaintiff
who had been granted federal habeas corpus relief was not eligible for wrongful imprisonment
compensation under a state statute).
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amount of damages recoverable under the statute. 27 1 State statutes
provide varying methods for calculating damages for wrongful
conviction and incarceration. 272 Some states set strict limits on the
amount of damages recoverable, regardless of the amount of time
spent wrongfully imprisoned. 273 The amount of damages recoverable
in a wrongful imprisonment action against the federal government is
currently limited to $5,000 per year-even in capital cases. 274
C. Why These Remedies Are Inadequate
The available remedies for restoring innocence after wrongful
conviction are inadequate-both procedurally as applied to those who
are wrongfully convicted and substantively as applied to those
wrongfully sentenced to death row. First, because of the virtually
insurmountable procedural barriers that they impose and because of
their limits on recovery, state wrongful imprisonment statutes are
often a significant obstacle to compensation rather than a sufficient
means of redress. The difficulties imposed by these statutes force the
wrongfully convicted to undergo additional trouble if they wish to
obtain compensation. Because of these hurdles, released innocents
may avoid seeking recovery. 275 They choose instead to ignore a legal
system that has failed them once. This decision further weakens the
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. 276
Second, the current methods of obtaining compensation for
wrongful conviction, including the proposed Innocence Protection Act,
do not adequately address the substantive differences between
convictions. 277 Because of the fundamental difference between a death
sentence and any other punishment passed down by the criminal
justice system, current methods of compensating the wrongly
271. See Annotation, supra note 252, at 655-56 (providing examples of various state
statutory methods for calculating wrongful imprisonment damages).
272. See id.
273. See, e.g., Ciancanelli v. Cal. State Bd. of Control, 248 Cal. App. 2d 705, 707-08 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) (holding that $5,000 was the limitation for recovery for a wrongful felony conviction
even though the claimant had sustained greater losses). But see FloridaPays Men $500,000 Each
for
Wrongful Convictions, CNN.COM,
July
13,
1998,
available at http://www.cnn.comfUS/9807/13/deathrow.restitution (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (relating the story of two
men who had been wrongfully imprisoned on death row for twelve years and then finally had
received compensation thirty years after their convictions).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2000).
275. See, e.g., discussion supra Part IV.A (Kirk Bloodsworth case study).
276. Although the legal system maintains these entities as separate and distinct components
of the criminal justice system, capital defendants and convicted inmates are more likely to view
them as interconnected or even indistinguishable.
277. See S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001).
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imprisoned prove particularly inadequate when applied to innocent
individuals who have spent years on death row. 278 Because of the
severity of the punishment wrongfully imposed and its accompanying
psychological burdens, these individuals are entitled to greater
wrongful conviction damages than other released innocents. The fact
that they were previously denied the heightened procedural
safeguards supposedly present in the American capital punishment
27 9
system strengthens the case for this entitlement.
The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental difference
between capital punishment and any other sentence. 28 0 Providing
easier access to increased wrongful imprisonment compensation would
be consistent with the traditional attempt to distinguish the death
penalty from other forms of punishment. This distinction holds true
regardless of whether or not the system moves toward a moratorium
on or the abolition of the death penalty.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal system has been slow to keep up with recent shifts in
public opinion against the death penalty. 28 1 If federal and state
governments are not required to compensate innocents harmed by a
flawed judicial system adequately, there will be little governmental
incentive to improve the prosecutorial and judicial processes. If there
is no governmental incentive to improve the process from the inside,
innocent inmates on death row will be forced to wait for the relatively
slow shift of public opinion, relying upon their own persistence and the
work of private advocacy groups to lead to their exoneration. In
addition, without systemic change to the capital punishment system,
the government may be able to justify its inaction by pointing to
increases in DNA exonerations as evidence that the system is
working. Such governmental free riding on the efforts of private

278. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ., concurring) ("Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.").
279. For an analogy that demonstrates the practical lack of comparable situations: in a
classic torts case providing damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a woman
incorrectly told that her husband was near death after an accident recovered damages for her
ensuing emotional and psychological distress. Such a shock to a person's emotions and psyche,
however traumatic, certainly pales in comparison to the prospect of enduring years in prison for
a crime that one did not commit.
280. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.

281. See discussion supra Part I; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (refuting the
arguments of death penalty supporters by pointing to the demonstrated relationship between
support for capital punishment and ignorance of the problems in the system).
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citizens represents an acknowledgement of the abdication of the
criminal justice system's central mission of finding the truth.
The state and federal governments must take responsibility for
their mistakes to maintain the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system and its goal of enforcing individual accountability. Reforming
the capital punishment system by working to prevent the initial
occurrence of wrongful convictions is the obvious first step. But the
less obvious second step, reforming the system of compensating those
wrongfully sentenced to death, is just as integral to true systemic
reform. The criminal justice system should consider the advent of
DNA testing and its utility for both exoneration and investigation as
28 2
an opportunity to improve the system.
The recent improvements in and increased access to DNA
testing provide a unique window of opportunity. Because of the
accuracy of DNA testing and the certainty with which it can exonerate
wrongfully convicted individuals, providing restitution for those
exonerated from death row is more necessary than ever. Preventing
wrongful convictions and restoring preconviction status to the
wrongfully convicted are the most practical and least difficult means
by which the system can regain its legitimacy and efficacy. Reform
therefore should proceed with the dual motives of prevention and
restitution. By coordinating a plan of restitution with an increase in
inmates' access to DNA testing, the government may channel the
current shift in public opinion into support for improvements in the
criminal justice system. The government may first concentrate on the
problem of imprisoned innocents, then work to restore those released
innocents, and finally, address the systemic defects that lead to the
high incidence of wrongful convictions.
A. Nationwide Death Penalty Moratorium and FairnessStudies
Although recent actions, including the proposed Innocence
Protection Act, are an admirable start, more legislation is necessary to
guard against the possibility of convicting-and especially, of
executing-the innocent. Capital punishment, due to its finality,
differs more from life in prison than life imprisonment differs from a
prison term of a year or two. 28 3 Given the increasing frequency of

282. See generally supra note 25 and accompanying text.
283. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; see Margaret Koosed, Averting Mistaken Exectutions by
Adopting the Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 108-29 (2001) (advocating nationwide adoption of the Model Penal Code's
exclusion of death in the presence of lingering doubt to avoid wrongful convictions); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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innocents being exonerated and released, death penalty states should
declare moratoria on capital punishment-at least until fairness
28 4
studies take place. A federal moratorium should also be imposed.
B. Proceduraland Systemic Changes
If the capital punishment system remains in place, however,
certain procedural and systemic changes should occur to ensure that
the death penalty administration is as equitable as possible. The first
step would be the passage of the Innocence Protection Act. 28 5 The Act
would implement a system of DNA testing and DNA databases, while
28 6
also increasing the availability of defense counsel in capital cases.
DNA testing should be required of all individuals accused of crimes as
well as of all individuals currently on death row. In addition, the Act
would provide minimum standards requiring both the federal
government and the states to provide restitution to the wrongfully
28 7
convicted who are later exonerated.
Second, a higher standard of proof should be required in the
sentencing phase of capital cases. The Model Penal Code provides an
example of such a heightened standard, requiring that the evidence
foreclose "all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt" before allowing
the imposition of the death penalty. 288 In addition, effective assistance
of counsel should be a right at all levels in capital cases, including in
postconviction relief proceedings. 28 9 This right would be especially
helpful to those individuals who were inadequately represented at
trial or on appeal. Although none of these solutions would solve the
284. In 2001, Senator Russ Feingold introduced a bill "to place a moratorium on executions
by the Federal Government and urge the States to do the same, while a National Commission on
the Death Penalty reviews the fairness of the imposition of the death penalty." S. 233, 107th
Cong. (2001). The bill did not pass last year. Id. Most capital sentences are administered by the
states, and federal executions are extremely rare. See Michael A. Cokley, Comment, Whatever
Happened to that Old Saying "Thou Shalt Not Kill'? A Plea for the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 2 LoY. PUB. INT'L L.J. 67, 77-80 (2001). Timothy McVeigh's execution was the recent,
notable exception of a federal capital sentence.
If nationwide moratoria are not possible at present, the allowance of posthumous testing of
DNA evidence could provoke a debate forceful enough to overcome current obstacles. See, e.g.,
Moyes, supra note 17, at 987; Gross, supra note 21, at 471 (noting that proof of execution of
innocent prisoners contributed to successful abolition movements in both Michigan and
England).
285. Innocence Protection Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001).
286. § 201(b)-(c). The Act would make it a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for
states to deny death row inmates the right to DNA testing. See §§ 103-104.
287. §§ 301-302.
288. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.6(1)(f)

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

289. The Strickland standard should be altered in the context of capital cases. See supra note
67 and accompanying text.
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entire problem of wrongful convictions, implementing these changes
while capital punishment moratoria were in place would allow the
states and the federal government to assess their efficacy and
reevaluate the problems in the capital punishment system, while
simultaneously reducing the risk of executing the innocent. Imposing
death penalty moratoria remains, however, the necessary first step to
restoring innocence, because moratoria provide an opportunity for
careful consideration of the errors in the system.
C. Restitution for the Wrongfully Convicted
To properly account for systemic injustices and to restore
public confidence in the judicial system, changes must occur to ensure
that the wrongly convicted will be made as whole as possible after
their release. Other judicial systems can be instructive on this point.
Many nations provide substantial restitution for the wrongfully
convicted after their release. 290 For example, in England, an
independent review commission works to identify and correct wrongful
convictions. 29 1 The Criminal Cases Review Commission is an
independent executive body that basically acts as a governmentsponsored innocence project. 292 The commission has broad power to
investigate inmates' applications claiming innocence and to refer the
applications to the court of appeals for postconviction review. 293 The
court then reviews newly discovered evidence and employs a fairly
relaxed standard for overturning convictions. 294 A similar independent
commission in the United States could relieve the privately funded
innocence projects of some of their substantial caseloads while
indirectly restoring legitimacy to the judicial system.

290. See, e.g., Duncan Gardham, 27-Year Ordeal Over for Prisoner, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Austl.), Jan. 17, 2002, at § 27 (telling the story of a British man who was wrongfully imprisoned
for twenty-seven years and who was compensated six million Australian dollars upon his recent
release).
291. See Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective,
16 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2001) (explaining the English system and recommending that
a similar independent commission be created in the United States). Other nations tend to be
more generous with wrongful conviction damages, in terms of their monetary amounts and the
facility of the procedures of obtaining them. See, e.g., Anne Baylin, A Canadian Tragedy, CBS
NEWS ONLINE, (telling the story of David Milgaard, who was exonerated by DNA evidence after
spending twenty-three years in prison and who was awarded ten million Canadian dollars in
wrongful imprisonment damages upon his release), at http://www.truthinjustice.org/canadiantragedy.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
292. See Griffin, supra note 291, at 1275-76.
293. Id. at 1246.
294. Id.
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In addition, current standards for obtaining compensation after
wrongful incarceration do not account for the distinction between a
death sentence and any other sentence. They also do not address the
obvious qualitative difference in proof between an exoneration based
on random clemency or even errors at trial and one based on DNA
evidence of actual innocence. Wrongful imprisonment statutes should
be updated to reflect the recent innovations in DNA technology and
the resulting exonerations. Imposing heavy burdens of proof on those
who have already been exonerated pursuant to DNA evidence obviates
the presumption of innocence that is a central tenet of the American
criminal justice system. Once someone is proven innocent pursuant to
DNA evidence, which leaves no reasonable doubt, he should be
entitled to full compensation-for lost earnings, pain and suffering,
and reintroduction assistance-from the state for the harms suffered
as a result of wrongful incarceration, whether capital or not. The
presumption of innocence until proven guilty should reattach to an
individual as soon as it is shown by conclusive DNA evidence that he
295
was wrongfully convicted.
Both the state and federal systems need more accessible means
by which the wrongly convicted can seek redress. Rather than
requiring a separate cause of action to seek compensation for wrongful
imprisonment, statutes should provide an automatic accounting of
damages when an innocent person is released. This automatic
damages calculation should take into account more than the obvious
claim of lost wages following a wrongful incarceration. 296 Given the
qualitative difference between a death penalty conviction and other
sentences, economic restitution is not sufficient compensation for
wrongful imprisonment on death row. 297 Pain and suffering damages
should be available to the released innocent and could be calculated in
a manner similar to that employed in false imprisonment and other
tort contexts. Because the psychological impact of spending years on
death row while innocent cannot be ignored, psychological assistance
is a necessary component of restitution for those individuals
295. Related to this recommendation is the call for a strengthened "presumption of life" in
capital sentencing, which would require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the death penalty is the only appropriate penalty rather than the default presumption of life
imprisonment for even the most heinous crimes. See Damien P. Delaney, Better to Let Ten Guilty
Men Live: The Presumption of Life-A Principle to Govern Capital Sentencing, 14 CAP. DEF. J.

283, 283-84 (2002).
296. Although such an automatic accounting would seem at first blush to present
insurmountable logistical and financial difficulties, wrongful death compensation in tort law and
insurance calculations would provide useful analogies for setting up such a system.
297. See discussion supra Part IV (providing case studies that demonstrate that the
problems faced by released innocents involve more than a lack of monetary assistance).
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wrongfully sentenced to die. Reentry assistance, including assistance
in finding housing and employment, should also be provided to help
former inmates readjust to normal life. 298 Such remedies must be
available without conditions attached and without statutory limits on
the amounts recoverable. Although such a system would not allow
wrongfully convicted individuals to regain the years lost, it would help
to restore the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of DNA testing and its use to exonerate
innocent inmates has provided the American public with a new
glimpse into the workings of the criminal justice system, including its
considerable defects. These problems are especially obvious in the
administration of the death penalty, as the increase in the number of
innocent individuals released from death row indicates. The frequency
of recent DNA exonerations provides persuasive evidence that the
American system of capital punishment is fundamentally flawed.
Setting aside the usual arsenal of moral, economic, and practical
arguments against the death penalty in and of itself, DNA
exonerations reveal that the death penalty may be unconstitutional as
applied. 299 Considering the number of innocents who have been
wrongfully convicted under the current system, there is a strong
argument that the continued application of this system of capital
punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.
Preventing future wrongful convictions in the United States
requires confronting the problem from both sides. In keeping with the
dual functions of the American criminal justice system-protecting the
innocent and convicting the guilty-a comprehensive plan of reform
must be both preventive and compensatory. Only by working both to

298. For example, all individuals exonerated after lengthy imprisonment face the simple
question of how to account for the missing years on a job application. Even though they are
actually innocent of the crimes for which they were imprisoned, the tarnish of time spent in
prison remains on their record as an affirmative obstacle to obtaining employment, while their
lack of updated job market skills serves as the accompanying negative obstacle.
299. But see, e.g., Cokley, supra note 284, at 77-80 (noting that eclipsing the question of
whether capital punishment constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment is the question of whether the death penalty, as currently administered,
permits the execution of the innocent).
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decrease the risk of executing the innocent and to restore to innocence
those who were wrongfully convicted will the judicial system regain its
legitimacy.
Jean Coleman Blackerby*
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